Florida State University College of Law

Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
11-2015

The Oedipus Hex: Regulating Family After Marriage Equality
Courtney Megan Cahill
Florida State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the
Sexuality and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regulating Family After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
183 (2015),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/520

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

The Oedipus Hex: Regulating Family
After Marriage Equality
Courtney Megan Cahill∗
Now that national marriage equality for same-sex couples has become
the law of the land, commentators are turning their attention from the
relationships into which some gays and lesbians enter to the mechanisms
on which they — and many others — rely in order to reproduce. Even as
one culture war makes way for another, however, there is something that
binds them: a desire to establish the family. This Article focuses on a
problematic manifestation of that desire: the incest prevention
justification. The incest prevention justification posits that the law ought
to regulate alternative reproduction in order to minimize the potential for
accidental incest between individuals involved in the donor conception
process. A leading argument offered by both conservatives and
progressives in defense of greater regulation of alternative reproduction,
the incest prevention justification hearkens back in troubling ways to a
taboo long used in American law to discipline the family. That
justification is problematic not just in theory, but also in fact: it could
catalyze regulation that radically reforms the fertility industry, producing
adverse effects on the only way in which thousands of persons each year
are able to have children and become parents.
This Article uses the incest prevention justification as an opportunity to
consider the scope of a marriage equality precedent — specifically, how,
and to what extent, such a precedent will affect the law of alternative
reproduction, a largely unregulated field. Even before the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of marriage equality in June 2015, scholars were
considering the impact that a marriage equality precedent could have in
domains outside of marriage. This Article furthers that inquiry by
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considering marriage equality’s potential impact on the regulation of
procreation. Its narrow objective is to argue that reproductive regulation
that flows from incest anxiety is both normatively undesirable and
constitutionally deficient; the logic that fueled marriage discrimination for
decades — the logic of the incest taboo — ought not, and likely cannot as
a constitutional matter, be grafted onto the law of alternative
reproduction. Its broader objective is to show that while marriage
inequality might be a thing of the past, at least for same-sex couples, its
animating logic persists in the way that we think about sexuality,
parenthood, and the family.
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INTRODUCTION
Alternative reproduction has become the new frontier in the
continuing culture wars over the family.1 Prominent marriage
traditionalists are turning their attention from same-sex marriage to it,
arguing that the time has come to stop obsessing over marriage
between same-sex partners and to start taking a more critical look at
the ways in which they — and many others — reproduce.2 Even as
one culture war makes way for another, however, there is something
that binds them: a desire to establish the family. This Article’s focus is
on a problematic manifestation of that desire: the incest prevention
justification, a leading argument offered in defense of radical reform of
alternative reproduction law and one that hearkens back in troubling
ways to a taboo long used in American law to discipline the family.
A few years ago, marriage traditionalists predicted that the law’s
recognition of same-sex marriage would lead the country down a
slippery slope to incest.3 Today, conservative and progressive thinkers
1 See A. James Rudin, The Coming Culture War over Fertility Technology, WASH.
POST (July 19, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on faith/the coming
culture war over fertility technology/2012/07/19/gJQAsbeRwW story.html.
Alternative
reproduction is defined as the panoply of ways that persons conceive and bear children
through assisted means, including alternative insemination, third party gamete (egg and
sperm) donation, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy. This Article’s focus is on third party
gamete donation and suggested reforms of it.
2 See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 2012), http:///www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how my view
on gay marriage changed.html (exhorting gay marriage opponents to abandon the
fight against marriage equality and take up the question of “whether both gays and
straight people should think twice before denying children born through artificial
reproductive technology the right to know and be known by their biological
parents?”); see also infra notes 32 34 and accompanying text.
3 See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the
Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest
Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1544 45 (2005) [hereinafter Same Sex Marriage,
Slippery Slope Rhetoric] (summarizing the claim that the legal recognition of same sex
relationships will lead inevitably to the legal recognition of consensual incest). The
slippery slope “from same sex marriage to incest” argument was recently made by
Justice Sotomayor in oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 46 47, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12 144);
David Weigel, Ben Carson vs. Sonia Sotomayor, Round Zero, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/03/29/ben carson vs sonia sotomayor round
zero.html. The “slippery slope to incest” formulation was also a stock feature of
radical racists’ arguments against miscegenation. See infra notes 158 68 and
accompanying text. Finally, incest emerged during oral argument in Obergefell v.
Hodges, when Justice Samuel Alito asked Solicitor General Donald Verrilli whether the
law ought to treat same sex couples any differently than it does “unmarried siblings.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos.
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alike — including David Blankenhorn (on the conservative side) and
law professor Naomi Cahn (on the progressive side) — warn that the
law’s failure to regulate alternative reproduction could precipitate
“accidental incest” between blood-related individuals.4 Described as a
“pervasive [fear] in the reproductive world”5 and a “growing concern
within industry watchdog groups,”6 accidental incest is offered as not
just a reason but the best reason7 to pass laws that significantly alter
the practice of alternative reproduction as it currently exists in the
United States, including laws abolishing gamete donor anonymity8 and
laws mandating caps on gamete donation.9 Other countries have
14 556, 14 562, 14 571, 14 574).
4 See infra notes 43 53 and accompanying text. The phrase “accidental incest”
has been used by various actors to describe the dangers allegedly associated with
unregulated alternative reproduction. See Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the
Line or the Curtain?
For Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59, 59
60 (2009) [hereinafter Accidental Incest]; Libby Purves, Whose Body Is It, Anyway?
Yours, Naturally, TIMES (Eng.) (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/
columnists/libbypurves/article2043028.ece. While commentators are increasingly
adverting to the potential for accidental incest between persons involved in alternative
reproduction as a reason to regulate it, the relationship between incest and alternative
reproduction is not new. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. The late professor
and former head of the President’s Council on Bioethics, Leon Kass, argued that
reproductive cloning would lead to knowing incest between parents and their clones.
See infra note 163. Similarly, in the relatively early days of alternative insemination,
commentators warned that anonymous sperm donation would lead to accidental
incest. See Martin Curie Cohen, The Frequency of Consanguineous Matings Due to
Multiple Use of Donors in Artificial Insemination, 32 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 589, 590
(1980); see also infra note 174 and accompanying text.
5 Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 4, at 60 & n.3.
6 Id. at 60 n.3; Steven Kotler, The God of Sperm, L.A. WKLY. (Sept. 26, 2007),
http://www.laweekly.com/2007 09 27/news/the god of sperm/.
7 See NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR CONCEIVED FAMILIES
117 (2013) [hereinafter NEW KINSHIP] (arguing that “incest provides an excellent
example or case study to use in pushing for wider regulation of the industry” and that
“incest is one of the key, driving issues for disclosure”).
8 See id. at 129 (discussing the necessity for disclosure of donors to offspring and
addressing potential steps toward legislation); Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100
GEO. L.J. 367, 413 (2012) [hereinafter The New Kinship] (arguing that “federal and
state law should provide for limited disclosure of the donor’s identity once offspring
turn eighteen” and that such laws should “preempt private agreements . . . to the
contrary”); Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor
Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203, 203 06 (2009) [hereinafter
Necessary Subjects] (advocating federal legislation that would abolish gamete donor
anonymity and establish a national mandatory donor registry and presenting the need
for such a registry, including accidental incest prevention).
9 CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 105, 155 (advocating limits on gamete
donations).
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passed such laws (in order to minimize the threat of incest) and the
United States ought to as well, critics contend.10 A failure to do so,
they argue, could result in an “[i]ncest [e]pidemic,”11 a situation
where “one donor . . . populate[s] the world”12 and where “genetically
related offspring . . . marry each other”13 by mistake.
This Article refers to these incest-motivated arguments in favor of
greater regulation of alternative reproduction as the incest prevention
justification. It contends that that justification warrants serious
attention for several reasons, including its potential to catalyze legal
reforms of alternative reproduction that have debilitating effects on its
multiple users — single women, heterosexual couples, and sexual
minorities — and their offspring.14 In addition, and more pressing
here, the incest prevention justification is allied with a taboo whose
principal purpose and effect are to establish the traditional family. The
incest prevention justification’s establishment function is alone reason
to reject it, especially considering that the “traditional nuclear family
— where mom is married to dad and they are raising their biological
kids — is no longer the norm in America.”15 Beyond its troubling
normative implications, the incest prevention justification is
constitutionally deficient because it reflects and reproduces a way of
thinking about the family that courts in marriage equality cases are
rapidly discrediting. The same logic that has been used to justify
marriage discrimination in the past ought not — and likely cannot, as

10 Currently, no state in the United States prohibits gamete donor anonymity or
places caps on the number of successful gamete donations. Several countries,
including England, Austria, and Spain, prohibit gamete donor anonymity and/or have
instituted mandatory caps on gamete donation. Incest has played a role in some of
those countries’ decisions to pass those regulations. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
& SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION
AND EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, Cm. 9314, at 26 27 (U.K.), available at http://www.hfea.gov.
uk/docs/Warnock Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology 1984.pdf (discussing accidental incest concerns and recommending
mandatory caps on the number of successful gamete donations in England in order to
minimize those concerns).
11 Rachel East, Fertility Clinics Could Cause an Incest Epidemic in America: Lack of
Regulation on Sperm Donation Leads to One Man Fathering 150 Children, MORTON REP.
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.themortonreport.com/discoveries/stranger/are fertility
clinics going to cause an incest epidemic/.
12 Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 8, at 412.
13 Id.
14 For a discussion of these effects, see infra Part I.B.
15 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1883 (2012).
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a matter of constitutional law — be grafted onto the law of alternative
reproduction.
On its face a straightforward argument, the incest prevention
justification partakes of a taboo whose purpose and effect are familial
establishment. A long line of theorists have shown that the incest
taboo is not about preventing consanguineous unions and their
possible genetic consequences, but about establishing traditional sex
and family roles. For instance, in an influential essay published in
1975, feminist philosopher Gayle Rubin argued that “incest
taboos . . . cannot be explained as having the aim of preventing the
occurrence of genetically close matings.”16 Rather, she contends there,
the incest taboo is fundamentally concerned with establishing
normative gender roles, sexual identity, and familial identity.17
Writers both before and after Rubin also elaborated on the incest
taboo’s establishment dimension. One of the twentieth century’s most
famous expositors of the incest taboo, Claude Lévi-Strauss, argued
that the incest taboo was responsible for establishing no less than
society itself.18 More recently, philosopher Judith Butler has argued
that a primary function of the taboo — and of the legal arguments that
depend on it — is to establish a certain kind of family “as the only
intelligible and livable one[].”19 Butler’s analysis, which is considered
at greater length below,20 is particularly useful in explaining why
incest anxiety tends to surface when non-traditional familial structures
press for legal recognition, as it did in the nineteenth century when
inter-racial couples sought the right to marry and again in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries when same-sex couples sought
relationship recognition.21 As she explains, it is during moments of
familial transformation and contestation when the need to establish
what counts as “family” is at its height.
A taboo that both in theory and in fact is routinely deployed to
establish the traditional family ought to arouse skepticism, particularly
given its past role in establishing the intra-racial and opposite-sex
family. No less concerning, though, are the constitutional implications
of using the incest taboo to reform the law of alternative reproduction.
16 Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex, in
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 183 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975).
17 See id. at 199.
18 See infra notes 131 36 and accompanying text.
19 JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM: KINSHIP BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH 70 (2000)
[hereinafter ANTIGONE’S CLAIM].
20 See infra Part III.A.
21 See infra Part III.B.
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Contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence — and especially the
wave of pro-marriage-equality decisions that has swept the nation
since the Supreme Court’s 2013 landmark ruling in United States v.
Windsor22 — stands for the obvious proposition that the federal
Constitution protects a right to marry and prohibits marriage
discrimination against gays and lesbians.23 But as scholars are
increasingly recognizing, those decisions “do not simply expand
access to the institution of marriage.”24 Rather, or in addition, they
stand for a much larger and more radical proposition, namely, that the
federal Constitution prohibits the state from privileging families that
conform to its preferred domestic paradigm — heterosexual, dualgendered, biological parenthood — and from punishing families that
deviate from it. In addition, these cases stand for the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects not just the fundamental right to
marry, but also, in the words of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, the fundamental right to “establish a family.”25
This Article contends that laws predicated on the incest taboo,
including laws curtailing alternative reproduction that might be
passed on incest prevention grounds, are in tension with the trend in
American constitutional law toward greater familial autonomy. It
argues that to allow incest anxiety to inform (and reform) the law of
22 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). For federal appeals courts that have
struck down marriage equality bans, see, for example, Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352
(4th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760
F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014); Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). For federal
district courts that have struck down marriage equality bans, see, for example, Latta v.
Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542
(W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp.
2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014); De
Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014). For courts that have upheld
marriage equality bans since Windsor was decided in 2013, see DeBoer v. Snyder, 772
F.3d 388, 402 03, 418 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 919 (E.D. La. 2014), recalled, Nos.
13 5090 C/W, 14 97, 14 327, 2015 WL 4090353 (E.D. La. 2015).
23 Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 827 (2014) (stating that “[c]ourts in the recent marriage
cases have held that state action that enforces [a] single, heterosexual model of the
family violates gays’ and lesbians’ equality interests and their liberty interests”
(emphasis added)).
24 Id. at 828.
25 Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1199 (emphasis added) (holding that “the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children,
and enjoy the full protection of a state’s marital laws”).
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alternative reproduction would be to maintain the logic that informed
marriage inequality for decades — specifically, the logic of familial
establishment. That logic, this Article shows, has recently been
rejected by courts as inconsistent with contemporary constitutional
norms and values about intimate and family life and incompatible with
the fundamental right to “establish a family.”26 Most notably, that
logic was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark
marriage equality case Obergefell v. Hodges.27 The Obergefell majority
not only recognized that same-sex couples had for years been
“establish[ing] families,”28 but also reinforced strong constitutional
norms of familial disestablishment and familial choice. “[C]hoices
concerning . . . family relationships,” the majority declared, “are
protected by the Constitution”;29 like “decisions concerning marriage,”
the majority continued, decisions about family “are among the most
intimate that an individual can make.”30 Beyond creating a national
marriage equality precedent, then, Obergefell renders uncertain the
validity of all laws that establish the family — including regulatory
regimes, both within and beyond the alternative reproductive context,
that derive from a taboo whose primary purpose is familial
establishment.
While skeptical of all justifications for regulating alternative
reproduction that hearken back to marriage inequality, this Article is
especially concerned with the incest prevention justification. Not only
is it a leading rationale offered by commentators in favor of greater
regulation of the fertility industry, but it is also the one whose
normative objective is largely unseen, appearing on its face to be a
biologically-driven response — a response, that is, to the genetic
consequences of accidental incest between donor-conceived kin — to
the considerable expansion of alternative reproduction in the United
States.31

26

Id.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2599.
30 Id.
31 In this sense, the incest prevention argument is of a piece with arguments from
other legal contexts
abortion, marriage equality
that similarly blend biological
and normative reasoning. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal
Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1511 (2013); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and
Gender, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 83, 83 84 (2013) [hereinafter Marriage, Biology]; Reva
Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 265 66 (1992).
27
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Perhaps most troubling, though, is the fact that the incest
prevention justification has garnered support on the right and the left
alike, thus making its codification into law largely uncontroversial,
and intersects with a phenomenon that warrants critique: the use of
alternative reproduction law to establish the traditional family. David
Blankenhorn, erstwhile marriage equality foe who recently shocked
the world by coming out in favor of same-sex marriage, has exhorted
fellow conservatives to “get[] in front of the issue” of same-sex
marriage by controlling the meaning and scope of a marriage equality
precedent to further traditionalist ends.32 As Cary Franklin explains,
Blankenhorn and other traditionalists are attempting to control the
import of a marriage equality precedent by “constructing a narrative
about same-sex marriage that [will] shape its cultural and
constitutional meaning for generations to come.”33 In creating that
narrative, Blankenhorn has chosen to focus on marriage, procreation,
and parenthood — and, in particular, on the desired relationship
between marriage and biological parenthood.34
As this Article demonstrates, invoking incest as a reason to regulate
procreation and parenthood is in many ways integral to Blankenhorn’s
traditionalist project. Gayle Rubin once wrote that the incest taboo
“dominate[s] our sexual lives, our ideas about men and women, and
the ways we raise our children.”35 Given the taboo’s past role in
shoring up prohibitions of non-traditional relationships that provoked
societal discomfort, it is unsurprising that it has surfaced as one of the
dominant rationales for regulating non-traditional methods of family
formation. Its emergence in contemporary debates over alternative
reproduction reminds us that while official marriage inequality has
ended, at least for same-sex couples,36 its animating logic persists in
the way that we think about sexuality, parenthood, and the family.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a more detailed
overview of the incest prevention justification and considers the legal
reforms that it could help to catalyze. Part II proposes a conceptual
shift, from thinking about the incest prevention justification in terms
of genetics and biology to thinking about it in terms of family norms.
32

DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 1 (2007).
Franklin, supra note 23, at 822.
34 See infra notes 183 87 and accompanying text.
35 Rubin, supra note 16, at 199.
36 For instance, notwithstanding Chief Justice John Roberts’ suggestion that
Obergefell paves the way for plural marriage, Obergefell’s narrow holding applies to
same sex couples, not to multi party relationships. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2621 22 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
33
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More specifically, this Part elucidates the incest prevention
justification’s weaknesses and uses them as an opportunity to question
the normative work that argument is doing in contemporary debates
over alternative reproduction. Where Part II introduces that question,
Parts III and IV answer it by using legal history and theory to argue
that the contemporary incest prevention justification, like its
antecedents and like the incest taboo more generally, is being used to
establish a normative conception of the family, one that necessarily
includes two biological parents of different sexes and that is bound by
“the genetic tie.”37 Part V uses the insights made and the conclusions
drawn in the two previous Parts to appraise — and reject —
alternative reproduction’s incest prevention justification on both
normative and constitutional grounds.
I.

THE NEW KINSHIP MEETS AN OLD TABOO

This Part explains alternative reproduction’s incest prevention
justification as well as its potential consequences. Section A sets forth
that justification and Section B considers its far-reaching potential,
including the legal reforms that it could help to catalyze and the
significant costs that it could impose on those individuals who rely on
alternative reproduction as a method of family formation.
A. The Incest Prevention Justification
The contemporary incest prevention justification derives from a
concern about the relative lack of regulation that marks the fertility
industry.38 Alternative reproduction has been legal in the United States

37 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 211 (1995)
(providing “an alternative vision of the genetic tie, inspired by definitions of self,
family, and community in Black American culture, that recognizes genetic bonds
without giving them the power to devalue and exclude other types of relationships”).
38 See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 23 (noting that as a general matter
“[t]he medical profession is typically regulated by the states or is self regulated
through physicians’ professional organizations, not by the federal government”); id. at
27 (recognizing that “there is no top down governance” in the fertility industry
specifically); NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS
LEGAL REGULATION 25 (2009) [hereinafter TEST TUBE FAMILIES] (discussing the lack of
state and federal regulation of the fertility industry and advocating greater regulation
of it); DEBORA SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 5 (2006); Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why
Requiring Exposed Donation Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 379
(2009) (observing that “[p]resently, there is a serious lack of meaningful regulation
over and accountability on the part of sperm banks”).
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for over fifty years,39 and has remained largely unregulated by state
governments and the federal government during that time. Most of the
regulations that do exist apply to the health-related and safety-related
aspects of gamete donation rather than to the actual procedures
involved in alternative procreation.40 Moreover, those regulations are
concerned exclusively with what happens before, rather than after,
gamete donation.
For instance, the federal government requires sperm and egg banks
to follow certain safety, training, and educational standards, including
the mandatory screening and testing of all gamete providers (and their
products) for communicable diseases like HIV and Hepatitis B. It does
not, however, require that donors reveal their identity to the children
and to the families that they help to create.41 Nor does it require
donors to report health information to clinics, or clinics to report
health information to donor-conceived children. Finally, no regulatory
body places mandatory caps on the number of times that any one
39 See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look
at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1083 97 (2002) [hereinafter Socio
Legal Acceptance] (explaining how alternative insemination became legalized in the
1960s). As Bernstein notes, “[t]he trend of legalization and its consequent direct
modification of family law concepts to accommodate the technology of AI [artificial
insemination] continued through the 1970s” with the passage of the Uniform
Parentage Act (“UPA”) of 1973, which “provided that AID with the husband’s consent
is legal and further that the donor is not perceived to be the natural father.” Id. at
1090. Notwithstanding the UPA’s passage (and modification in 2000), legal issues
continue to surround the use of alternative insemination by lesbians and unmarried
women, as most states’ alternative insemination protection extends only to married
women in a heterosexual relationship. See id. at 1106; see also Courtney G. Joslin,
Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1178 79 (2010) (stating that “[d]espite . . . data indicating that
increasing numbers of unmarried women
both gay and straight
are having
children through ART, the relevant parentage statutes in the vast majority of states
address only children born to heterosexual married couples”); Nancy D. Polikoff, A
Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian
Couples in the Twenty First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R & C.L. 201, 203 (2009) (discussing
the absence of legal protection for unmarried female users of alternative insemination
and proposing a model law that would protect that group based on a District of
Columbia statute).
40 As Cahn puts it: “The FDA guidelines are somewhat limited; they do not
regulate the practice of ART, only the collection, processing, storage, and distribution
of human gametes as the ‘articles of ART.’” CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 24.
41 One exception here is the state of Washington, which adopted a modified open
identity statute in 2011. See Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on
Gamete Donor Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
291, 293 94 (2013). Open identity is just the “default option,” however, and donors
may choose to “opt out,” although their “medical records remain available.” Id.
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person can donate gametes or on the number of families that can
conceive from them. In sum, “self-policing,” rather than “top-down
governance,” marks the fertility industry.42
Two of the issues mentioned above — the lack of mandatory caps
on gamete donation and anonymous gamete donation — are
particularly troubling for a growing number of commentators who
believe that they could lead to “inadvertent consanguineous
conception,” known more colloquially as “accidental incest.”43 Most
vocal among them is Professor Naomi Cahn, a legal expert on
alternative reproduction who has written extensively and thoughtfully
on the subject44 and who has recently voiced serious concern about a
few of its routine practices.
In Cahn’s view, donor anonymity and unrestricted gamete donation
work together to lay the perfect conditions for accidental incest
between consanguineous kin.45 Children conceived from anonymous
donors lack the sort of information that would allow them to identify
who, exactly, their genetic progenitor is. Coupled with the fact that
legal limits on the number of times that any one person can donate do
not exist in the United States, anonymous donation renders unwitting
incest between donor-conceived children — or, in a tragic reenactment of Oedipus Rex,46 between donor-conceived children and
42 CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 27. While the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”), the industry’s principal trade group, has
promulgated certain recommendations
including the recommendation that clinics
limit a single donor to no more than twenty five births based on an area population of
800,000 to avoid the risk of “inadvertent consanguineous conception”
clinics are in
no way bound by those recommendations, as they are just non binding industry
standards. See The Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Guidelines for Oocyte Donation, 70
FERTILITY & STERILITY 5S, 6S (1998).
43 Commentators have recently raised the possibility of accidental incest arising
from anonymous embryo donation. See Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Get Used to Embryo
Adoption, TIME (Aug. 24, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/08/24/get used to embryo
adoption/?iid=tsmodule. Incest concerns have also surfaced in the context of
intrafamilial medically alternative reproduction (“IMAR”), which is the practice of
using the gametes of family members to reproduce. See European Soc’y of Human
Reprod. and Embryology, Intrafamilial Medically Alternative Reproduction, SCI. DAILY
(Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/01/110120100942.htm;
see also Guido Pennings, Incest, Gamete Donation by Siblings and the Importance of the
Genetic Link, 4 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 13, 13 (2001).
44 See supra notes 6 7 and accompanying text.
45 See Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 4 passim.
46 See SOPHOCLES: THE OEDIPUS CYCLE (Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitzgerald trans.,
1949) (recounting the first play of Sophocles’ trilogy, Oedipus Rex, the tragic fall of the
king of Thebes, who “accidentally” fell in love with his mother (Jocasta) after killing
his father (Laius)). Like the Model Penal Code’s incest definition, criminal incest laws

2015]

The Oedipus Hex

195

their biological progenitors — a real possibility. In the most extreme
version of this slippery slope scenario, one donor “populate[s] the
world,”47 making sexual relationships and marriage between
genetically related persons all but certain.
Cahn is not alone in her concern about the risk of family romance
that alternative reproduction creates. A few outspoken consumers and
suppliers of gametes have publicly voiced similar concerns,48 as have
political actors,49 prominent members of the Catholic Church,50 and
some national organizations. Most influential among the latter is the
Institute for American Values (“Institute”), a public policy think tank
“devoted to contributing intellectually to the renewal of marriage and
family life and the sources of competence, character, and
citizenship.”51 Founded (and led) by David Blankenhorn, a former
opponent of same-sex marriage52 and the “star witness” for
incorporate a scienter requirement, which is far from satisfied if half siblings engage in
inadvertent romance. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(providing that a person is guilty of incest “if he knowingly marries or cohabits or has
sexual intercourse with an ancestor or descendant, a brother or sister of the whole or
half blood [or an uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole blood]”). Indeed, at least
as far as the criminal law is concerned, “accidental incest” is not “incest” at all, if
“incest” is defined as intentional sexual activity between people who are related within
a certain statutorily prohibited degree. See id.
47 Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 8, at 412.
48 See Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html. Mroz discusses the
creation of the Donor Sibling Registry (“Registry”) by Wendy Kramer and her son,
Ryan Kramer; the Registry is available at DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, https://www.
donorsiblingregistry.com/ (last visited July 16, 2015). Individuals can search for
“siblings” conceived from the same donor after signing up with the Registry and
providing the donor number used at the sperm bank. Id. Ms. Kramer is the co author,
with Naomi Cahn, of a recent guide for families with donor conceived children. See
generally WENDY KRAMER & NAOMI CAHN, FINDING OUR FAMILIES: A FIRST OF ITS KIND
BOOK FOR DONOR CONCEIVED PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES (2013).
49 For instance, perennial United States Senate candidate Alan Keyes attempted to
stir incest fears when discussing alternative insemination by lesbians during a 2004
Illinois debate with then Senate candidate Barack Obama. See Obama Debate
Flashback: Obama Flubs Keyes Rebuttal (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 03, 2008,
5:44 PM EST), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/23/obama debate flashback
ob n 128682.html.
50 See Spanish Bishops Decries New Law on Assisted Reproduction, CATH. NEWS
AGENCY (Feb. 20, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/
spanish bishops decries new law on assisted reproduction/.
51 Gay Marriage in Theology, Law and Politics, BOS. COLL. BOISI CTR. FOR RELIGION
& AM. PUB. LIFE, http://www.bc.edu/centers/boisi/publicevents/s08/gaymarriage.html
(last visited Aug. 1, 2015); see also INST. FOR AM. VALUES, http://www.americanvalues.
org/ (last visited July 16, 2015).
52 David Blankenhorn publicly repudiated his longtime opposition to same sex
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Proposition 8’s proponents in the federal trial over that amendment’s
constitutionality,53 the Institute has discussed incest fears in a number
of its publications dealing with alternative reproduction. These
publications are critical of alternative reproduction in part because of
the accidental incest threat that it purportedly raises.
Consider, for instance, the incest anxiety that appears in the
Institute’s 2010 report on anonymous sperm donation, My Daddy’s
Name is Donor: A New Study of Young Adults Conceived Through Sperm
Donation (“My Daddy’s Name is Donor”).54 There, the Institute
summarizes the findings of a study which it commissioned and whose
objective it was “to learn about the identity, kinship, well-being, and
social justice experiences of young adults who were conceived
through sperm donation.”55 The study specifically asked each of its
participants to what extent she agreed with the following statement:
“When I’m romantically attracted to someone I have worried that we
could be unknowingly related.”56 After comparing the responses of
marriage two years ago in a New York Times Op Ed described as “shocking” and
“astonishing.” Blankenhorn, supra note 2. For commentary on Blankenhorn’s
announcement, see Richard Kim, What’s Still the Matter with David Blankenhorn,
NATION (June 24, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/blog/168545/whats still matter
david blankenhorn/; Mark Oppenheimer, In Shift, an Activist Enlists Same Sex Couples
in a Pro Marriage Coalition, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/30/us/in shift blankenhorn forges a pro marriage coalition for all.html. Since
then, Blankenhorn has lost some conservative allies and financial contributors (Robert
George, Maggie Gallagher) and gained some more left leaning ones (Jonathan Rauch,
William Galston). See id. While Blankenhorn and the Institute might support gay
marriage, however, they remain committed to defending the traditional family, which
in their view consists of married, opposite sex parents and their biological children.
See infra notes 183 87 and accompanying text. This is the same kind of family, it
turns out, which Blankenhorn defended during his testimony in California’s marriage
equality case (known popularly as Proposition 8). See infra notes 183 85 and
accompanying text.
53 Frank Rich, Two Weddings, a Divorce and ‘Glee,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/opinion/13rich.html.
54 See generally ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, NORVAL D. GLENN & KAREN CLARK, INST.
FOR AM. VALUES, MY DADDY’S NAME IS DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS
CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM DONATION (2010), available at http://americanvalues.org/
catalog/pdfs/Donor FINAL.pdf.
55 Id. at 5. For studies that have found that donor conceived children were not
worse off (and, indeed, in some measures were better off) than children who were
sexually conceived, see Nanette K. Gartrell et al., Satisfaction with Known, Open
Identity, or Unknown Sperm Donors: Reports from Lesbian Mothers of 17 Year Old
Adolescents, 103 FERTILITY & STERILITY 242, 247 (2015); Nanette Gartrell & Henny
Bos, US National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17
Year Old Adolescents, 126 PEDIATRICS 28, 33 34 (2010).
56 MARQUARDT, GLENN & CLARK, supra note 54, at 109.
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donor-conceived children with those of adopted children and those of
children raised by two biological parents, the study concludes that
“[d]onor offspring often worry about the implications of interacting
with — and possibly forming intimate relationships with — unknown,
blood-related family members.”57 “A fear that most people raised by
their biological parents have never even considered and basically
cannot fathom,” the report continues, “is much on the minds of many
donor offspring, far more so even compared to the adopted.”58
The report concludes its section dealing with donor-conceived
individuals’ incest fears by suggesting that accidental incest among
donor-conceived persons is a real possibility. It says:
Okay, fine, a reader might respond, but has it ever happened
— that is, has anyone ever accidentally had sex with their
brother or sister? Well, yes. Last year in Britain a story came to
light of twins, male and female, separated at birth and adopted
by different families. They met, fell in love, and married —
and only then learned they were brother and sister.
Having the state say that you have no right to your medical
history. Feeling attracted to people you are unknowingly
related to. Realizing that you have accidentally committed
incest with your half-brother or sister. Watching your own
children entering the dating market and, with even more
trepidation than the average parent feels, worrying that they
might unknowingly date a cousin. These are the worries and
fears of adult donor offspring today. And yes, all of it can
happen.59
Incest anxiety reappears in the Institute’s most recent publication on
alternative reproduction and intentional parenthood: One Parent or
Five: A Global Look at Today’s New Intentional Families (“One Parent or
Five”).60 One Parent or Five presents itself as “the first systematic
critique of the concept of intentional parenthood,”61 a study which
“offers a surprising and at times disturbing portrayal of practices now

57

Id. at 8.
Id. at 35.
59 Id.
60 See generally ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, ONE
PARENT OR FIVE: A GLOBAL LOOK AT TODAY’S NEW INTENTIONAL FAMILIES (2011),
available at http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/one parent or five.pdf [hereinafter
ONE PARENT OR FIVE].
61 Id. at 6.
58
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being followed around the world.”62 These practices include
anonymous sperm donation, single mothers and fathers by choice,
posthumous conception, and poly-parenting, that is, three, four, and
five-parent families.63 Appraising anonymous sperm donation
specifically, One Parent or Five notes that donor-conceived children
fear “being attracted to or having sexual relations with someone to
whom they are unknowingly related.”64
Last, incest anxiety appears in some of the publications of Alana
Newman, an outspoken opponent of all alternative reproduction with
third-party gametes.65 Newman is a writer and researcher at the
Institute for American Values and at the Witherspoon Institute, the
conservative think tank that opposes same-sex marriage, alternative
reproduction, and non-biological parenthood.66 She is also the founder
of The Anonymous Us Project, “a story-collective for any and all
participants in 3PR [third-party reproduction].”67 In one Anonymous
Us story, the writer — a person conceived by anonymous donor
gametes — asks: “Will I be attracted to a familiar stranger in my
62

Id.
See id.
64 Id. at 55.
65 For a biographical overview of Newman, see ALANANEWMAN.COM, http://
alananewman.com/ (last visited July 16, 2015); Alana S. Newman, What Are the Rights
of Donor Conceived People?, WITHERSPOON INST. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/08/10511/ [hereinafter What Are the Rights?]. Newman
has argued that reproduction with third party gametes ought to be a crime. See id.
66 For the Witherspoon Institute’s mission statement, see The Mission of the
Witherspoon Institute, WITHERSPOON INST., http://winst.org/about/mission/ (last visited
July 17, 2015). The Witherspoon Institute reportedly funded the “Regnerus study,”
which compared children raised by gay parents to those raised by heterosexual
parents. The Regnerus study has come under serious attack by academics,
policymakers, and courts because of the cohort that Professor Regnerus used to study
the effects of gay parenting. For the study, see generally Mark Regnerus, How Different
Are the Adult Children of Parents Who Have Same Sex Relationships? Findings from the
New Family Structures Study, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 752 (2012). A Michigan district court
has criticized and rejected the study as “entirely unbelievable and not worthy of
serious consideration,” while others have summarized the Regnerus study’s myriad
critics. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d 772
F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014); Nathaniel Frank, The Shamelessness of Professor Mark
Regnerus, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/
2014/03/04/mark regnerus testifies in michigan same sex marriage case his study
is.html. For reports linking the study with the Witherspoon Institute, see Sofia
Resnick, Controversial Gay Marriage Study Author May Be Political Operative, SALON
(Apr. 11, 2013, 1:56 PM PDT), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/11/controversial gay
marriage study author may be political operative partner/.
67 See Anonymous Us, ALANANEWMAN.COM, http://alananewman.com/the anonymous
us project/ (last visited July 17, 2015).
63
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classes? Will I fall in love with him and kiss him passionately in an act
of accidental incest?”68 Similarly, in a blog post, Newman lists the
“threat of accidental incest” as one of the many dangers of sperm
donation, along with the “loss of identity, medical alienation, kin
alienation . . . disenfranchised grief, and confusion over the sacred vs.
commercial”69 that she believes donor-conceived children suffer.
It is worth noting that the argument from incest is not completely
new, as some writers raised the possibility of inadvertent
consanguinity during the early (or earlier) years of alternative
insemination.70 In the past, though, commentators mentioned
accidental incest only fleetingly when discussing the ramifications of
certain methods of alternative reproduction. Today, as the next
Section shows, commentators are citing accidental incest as not just a
reason, but one of the best reasons to regulate alternative
reproduction.71
B. The Incest Prevention Justification’s Potential Effects
Alternative reproduction’s incest prevention justification is a
slippery slope argument, one that posits that something at the top of
the slope (alternative reproduction) ought to be regulated, restricted,
or eliminated in order to avert something even worse at the bottom

68 Uncertainty Is Killing Me, ANONYMOUSUS.ORG (Feb. 6, 2012), http://
anonymousus.org/uncertainty is killing me/.
69 Introduction to Harms of Donor Conception, ALANANEWMAN.COM (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://alananewman.com/introduction to harms of donor conception/.
70 For instance, in a 1948 Virginia Law Review note, one student writer queried
whether doctors could “prevent [the] possible consanguinity resulting from [the]
practice” of artificial insemination. Note, Artificial Insemination Versus Adoption, 34
VA. L. REV. 822, 824 (1948). And in 1956, the author of a New York University Law
Review article averred that “[t]here can be little doubt that the increasing production
of children by means of artificial insemination from unknown donors enhances the
possibilities of incestuous marriages and incestuous relationships.” Morris Ploscowe,
The Place of Law in Medico Moral Problems: A Legal View II, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238,
1243 (1956); see also George P. Smith, II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial
Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 133 (1968). Around this same time on
the other side of the Atlantic, one scholar from the London School of Economics went
so far as to develop a mathematical formula for estimating the frequency of
“incestuous marriages” that could result from artificial insemination. John Hajnal,
Artificial Insemination and the Frequency of Incestuous Marriages, 123 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC’Y 182, 182 85 (1960). For other publications that explore the connection between
alternative reproduction and incest around this time period, see N.L. Ross, Artificial
Insemination, Incest, and New Genetic Nightmares, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1974, at L4.
71 See infra notes 80 85 and accompanying text.
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(accidental incest).72 For instance, it is the Institute for American
Values’s hope that the possibility of accidental incest, along with other
perceived hazards of alternative reproduction, will convince
lawmakers to ban all alternative reproduction that permits individuals
to have children who will not know either, or both, of their biological
progenitors — as, for example, when a single woman or a lesbian
same-sex couple uses anonymous donor sperm to conceive a child.
The Institute’s first report on alternative reproduction, The Revolution
in Parenthood: The Emerging Global Clash Between Adult Rights and
Children’s Needs (“The Revolution in Parenthood”),73 recommends a
“moratorium or a ‘time out’ [of] five years” on all alternative
reproduction in order for policymakers and lawmakers to reflect and
deliberate on its potential consequences.74
The Institute’s second report, My Daddy’s Name is Donor, goes
further. There, the Institute uses the incest threat to urge “leaders in
the law” to reconsider non-biological and “intentional” parenthood
(other than adoption).75 It says: “Contrary to the arguments put forth
by legal scholars who advocate for a guiding principle based on
‘intentional parenthood,’ there is not much empirical basis to suggest
that ‘intentional parenthood’ is good for children, and there are
substantial reasons to question that principle.”76 If “intentional
parenthood” and the procedures that facilitate it (including gamete
donation) are not abolished, then it is the Institute’s position that
lawmakers ought to pass regulations that require “screening of
prospective parents” prior to reproducing with third-party
assistance.77
In addition, the Institute urges “would-be parents” to consider not
reproducing at all if such reproduction involves gamete donation. It says:
We fully sympathize with the pain of infertility and the desire
to have a child. We also ask that if you are considering having
a child with donated sperm or eggs, you avail yourself of all
72 See Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, supra note 3, at 1550 54
(discussing the mechanics of the slippery slope).
73 ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL
CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S NEEDS (2006), available at
http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/parenthood.pdf. The Revolution in Parenthood
considers the possibility of accidental incest between donor conceived children, but
only briefly. See id. at 33, 38 n.49.
74 See id.
75 MARQUARDT, GLENN & CLARK, supra note 54, at 77.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 78.
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the available information about the impact on children, young
people, and their families of being conceived this way. Please
consider adoption, or acceptance, or being a loving stepparent,
foster parent, aunt or uncle, or community leader who works
with children. There are many ways to be actively involved
with raising the next generation without resorting to
conceiving a child who is purposefully destined never to share
a life with at least one of his or her biological parents.78
Where The Revolution in Parenthood recommends a temporary
cessation of alternative reproduction, then, My Daddy’s Name is Donor
endorses its elimination for those who use it to parent non-biological
children. In this sense, The Revolution in Parenthood and My Daddy’s
Name is Donor cohere with other statements that Blankenhorn has
made with respect to sperm donation — and why the state ought to
ban its use by anyone who cannot replicate the married, dualgendered, biological family.79
Like the Institute, Professor Naomi Cahn has also invoked
accidental incest as a catalyst for regulating alternative reproduction.
78

Id. at 79.
For instance, Blankenhorn concludes his New York Times Op Ed announcing
his newfound support for same sex marriage by pressing individuals to reconsider
whether they ought to be “denying” children biological parenthood by relying on
certain assisted reproductive means to have them. See Blankenhorn, supra note 2.
Similarly, in pro father manifesto Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent
Social Problem, Blankenhorn analogizes sperm donation to other “fatherless”
situations, like “deadbeat dads.” DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA:
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 172 (1995). He says: “[S]tate
legislatures across the nation should support fatherhood by regulating sperm banks.
New laws should prohibit sperm banks and others from selling sperm to unmarried
women and limit the use of artificial insemination to cases of married couples
experiencing fertility problems. In a good society, people do not traffic commercially
in the production of radically fatherless children.” Id. at 223. Blankenhorn makes this
recommendation after cataloguing the deleterious effects that sperm donation will
have on society, including “the decline of child well being and the rise of male
violence, particularly predatory sexual violence.” Id. at 184. “A society of Sperm
Fathers,” he warns, “is a society of fourteen year old girls with babies and fourteen
year old boys with guns.” Id. “Sperm Fatherhood,” he remarks, is a “means of paternal
suicide: the collaboration of the male in the eradication of his fatherhood.” Id. Indeed,
Blankenhorn goes so far as to compare sperm donation to the Nazis’ plan of
exterminating Europe’s Jewish population
a plan referred euphemistically as “the
final solution.” See id. He says: “Toward the end of the fatherless society, the Sperm
Father represents the final solution.” Id. Alana Newman, Blankenhorn’s colleague at
the Institute, argues that reproduction with third party gametes ought to be made
criminal, likening it to slavery and sexual predation. See Newman, What Are the
Rights?, supra note 65.
79
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Importantly, Cahn’s arguments in favor of greater regulation of
alternative reproduction are not as extreme as those espoused by
several writers at the Institute. For instance, unlike the Institute, Cahn
supports intentional parenthood, non-biological parenthood,
alternative family formation, and gay parenthood.80 Nevertheless,
Cahn proposes legal interventions that could have debilitating effects
on the procreative choice and opportunity of alternative
reproduction’s many users, from heterosexual couples and single
women to sexual minorities.
It is Professor Cahn’s hope that incest will be the issue that helps to
catalyze (what she sees as) much-needed legal reform in this area.
“[I]ncest,” she contends, “serves as a dramatic illustration of the
special nature of donor kinship.”81 She says:
[t]he potential for incest could be a way to create, change, or
impose laws that regulate the fertility industry. Sweeping legal
change often begins with something specific, and incest
provides an excellent example or case study to use in pushing
for wider regulation of the industry.82
Some of that regulation includes mandatory limits “on the number of
children born from any individual donor.”83 Some includes laws
requiring “special birth certificates for the donor conceived” indicating
that they were conceived through donor gametes.84 And some of it
includes mandatory disclosure and the elimination of gamete donor
anonymity. As Cahn puts it, incest is “one of the key, driving issues for
disclosure.”85
On this second point, Cahn is hopeful that incest’s “dangers” will
motivate the federal government to abolish donor anonymity
completely.86 Moreover, she is optimistic that a mandatory disclosure
80

See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 163 67.
Id. at 121.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Id.
84 See id. at 129. Cahn concedes that such birth certificates
which create a
separate, and possibly stigmatized, class of individuals and which infringe on those
individuals’ privacy
“may not be the optimal method.” Id.
85 Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
86 See Cahn, Necessary Subjects, supra note 8, at 219 21. Anonymous donation
would be eliminated by the establishment of a national mandatory donor registry,
which would require “that fertility clinics, sperm and egg banks, and physicians’
offices maintain records for each child born through donor gametes and guarantee[]
that gamete offspring have the right to access those records.” Id. Providers, banks, and
doctors that fail to comply with the registry’s requirements would be subject to
81
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regime will not lead to a substantial decrease in the number of
available donors, pointing to other countries, like England and
Sweden, where similar laws have gone into effect.87 In those countries,
she observes, mandatory disclosure led to an increase in older donors
(not to the eradication of all donors), as older donors were less
concerned about anonymity.88
Cahn’s proposals — and incest’s role in helping to shape them —
warrant skepticism for a few reasons. First, despite Cahn’s assurances
otherwise, there is strong reason to think that mandatory disclosure
reduces the number of sperm donors;89 certainly, that is a possibility
that would need to be offset by a clear benefit.90 According to several
commentators, mandatory disclosure regimes have led to donor
shortages in those countries that have instituted them, and in some
cases to severe shortages.91 For instance, a Time magazine article from
sanctions. See id. at 218. Moreover, donor conceived children could access the registry
to get identifying information about their donor upon reaching the age of majority.
See id. at 205. While Cahn’s proposed registry “prohibits” anonymous donation in the
sense that it requires fertility providers, banks, and doctors to obtain (and disclose)
identifying donor information, it does not require parents of donor conceived children
to inform their children that a federal registry with such information exists
indeed,
it does not require those parents to reveal to their children that they were donor
conceived at all. It is for this reason that Glenn Cohen characterizes Cahn’s proposal
as a “passive” rather than an “active” registry, one which requires a child to reach out
to it rather than one which “would itself contact the child at age eighteen to let him or
her know that he or she was donor conceived and allow (but not force) him or her to
receive information about the donor.” I. Glenn Cohen, Response: Rethinking Sperm
Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Non Identity, and One Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J.
432, 446 (2012) [hereinafter Rethinking Anonymity].
87 See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 162 (observing that “[i]n other
countries, the fears of accidental incest have resulted in precautionary legislation that
places limits on the number of offspring any given donor can produce” and discussing
such legislation in the Netherlands, Austria, and England).
88 See Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 8, at 421.
89 See Cohen, Rethinking Anonymity, supra note 86, at 444 (arguing that
mandatory sperm donor registries could have a “chilling effect on the willingness to
engage in donations”).
90 According to Cahn, that clear benefit is satisfying the “relational concerns of
family law.” See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 175 76 (stating that “[e]nsuring
an adequate supply of donors is critical to a medical model of donor families, but that
does not need to be sacrificed to the relational concerns of family law. . . . While it is
important not to limit access to reproductive technology on the basis of the parents, it
is critical to think about the impact of using particular technologies on all involved”).
This Article critiques that benefit on normative grounds below. See infra Part V.A and
accompanying text.
91 See Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty
and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1189, 1205 18 (2010) (revealing the negative
impact of prohibitions on gamete donor anonymity on gamete supplies in Victoria,
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June 2014 reports that England is experiencing a “serious sperm
shortage” because of its decision to ban sperm donor anonymity in
2005.92 Doctors there worry that the shortage will precipitate suboptimal practices, including “risky insemination practices like do-ityourself insemination with a friend’s sperm” and the use of lower
quality sperm by clinics “in order to get donors through the door.”93
Should mandatory disclosure become the law of the land in the United
States, then, users of alternative reproduction — including single
persons, sexual minorities, heterosexual couples, and asexuals94 —
may find it difficult, if not impossible, to become parents.
Second, a shift in the demographics of sperm donors is not
necessarily neutral and cannot be ignored. Recent studies suggest that
the gametes of older and younger donors are not alike in all ways. For
instance, in the most comprehensive study to date of paternal age and
offspring mental health (published in the journal JAMA Psychiatry and
Sweden, and the United Kingdom); June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Creating Life?
Examining the Legal, Ethical and Medical Issues of Assisted Reproductive Technologies:
Markets Subsidies Regulation and Trust: Building Ethical Understanding, 9 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 509, 540 41 (2006) (discussing the drop in gamete supplies at one
fertility clinic after Australia eliminated gamete donor anonymity); Judith F. Daar,
Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 46 (2008) (stating that “[e]xperience in other countries
confirms that mandating donor identity significantly reduces the number of donors
willing to provide gametes” and concluding that “a non anonymous donor policy in
the U.S. would reduce the availability of donor sperm for unmarried women, the vast
majority of whom rely on commercial sperm banks to fulfill their procreative
dreams”); Kristy Horsey, Sperm Donor “Crisis” in UK, BIONEWS (Sept. 18, 2006),
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page 12851.asp (describing the rapid decrease in donor
supplies in the United Kingdom following its adoption of a mandatory disclosure
regime). A mandatory disclosure regime could have additional negative effects,
including the sacrifice of reproductive users’ autonomy and the increased cost of
donated gametes. See I. Glenn Cohen & Travis G. Coan, Can You Buy Sperm Donor
Identification? An Experiment, 10 J. EMP. L. STUDS., 715, 742 43 (2013) (finding that the
price of donated sperm would increase under a mandatory disclosure regime); Ilke
Turkmendag, Robert Dingwall & Therese Murphy, The Removal of Donor Anonymity in
the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would Be Parents, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 283,
301 02 (2008) (discussing autonomy concerns).
92 Sam Frizell, UK Facing ‘Major’ Sperm Shortage, TIME (June 28, 2014),
http://time.com/2936014/uk sperm shortage/.
93 Id.
94 Asexuals
those who experience little to no sexual desire
might be
characterized as “socially infertile” in the same way that gays and lesbians are
sometimes said to be, as both groups inhabit contexts that render pregnancy
impossible without third party assistance, even as they might otherwise be “medically”
fertile. For a discussion of the way in which the law burdens asexuals across multiple
legal domains (but not in the third party reproduction context), see generally
Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 345 86 (2014).
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recently reported in The New York Times), researchers found that
“children born to middle-aged men are more likely than those born to
younger fathers to develop any of a range of mental difficulties,
including attention deficits, bipolar disorder, autism and
schizophrenia.”95 The mere possibility that these conditions are
associated with advanced paternal age might give some alternative
reproduction users pause when choosing older donors.96
95 K.J. Dell’Antonia, Older Fathers: Assessing the Risks, N.Y. TIMES: MOTHERLODE
(Feb. 26, 2014), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/older fathers assessing
the risks/; see also Benedict Carey, Mental Illness Rates Higher for Children of Older
Fathers, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
02/27/health/mental illness risk higher for children of older parents study finds.html
(discussing that children born to older fathers are more likely to develop mental
illnesses). For the JAMA study, see Brian M. D’Onofrio et al., Paternal Age at Childbearing
and Offspring Psychiatric and Academic Morbidity, 71 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 432, 437 38
(2014). For the link between advanced paternal age and autism, see K.J. Dell’Antonia,
The Clock Ticks for Men as Well, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/08/26/fashion/autism study starts clock for prospective fathers.html.
96 In this sense, laws abolishing sperm donor anonymity could alter not only the
persons “with whom” assisted reproductive users reproduce (e.g., older rather than
younger donors) but also “whether” assisted reproductive users reproduce at all (if,
say, users of third party reproduction no longer wanted the gametes of older donors
and the gametes of older donors were the only ones available). As such, these legal
interventions could create what Glenn Cohen has identified as a morally (and legally)
questionable “Non Identity Problem.” He says: “Unless the State’s failure to intervene
would foist upon the child a ‘life not worth living,’ any attempt to alter whether,
when, or with whom an individual reproduces cannot be justified on the basis that
harm will come to the resulting child, since but for that intervention the child would
not exist.” I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96
MINN. L. REV. 423, 426 (2011). The Non Identity Problem posits that “we cannot be
said to harm children by creating them as long as we do not give them a life not worth
living.” Id. at 437. Laws that restrict whether, when, and with whom individuals
reproduce because of a concern for their resulting children’s best interests pose a Non
Identity Problem, in Cohen’s view, because those laws in effect posit that it is better
for a child never to have come into existence than to be born into circumstances
adverse to their best interests
circumstances that include the mere possibility of
committing accidental incest with a donor conceived “sibling.” Cohen’s argument is
based on the “Non Identity Problem” of philosopher Derek Parfit. See id. John
Robertson applied Parfit’s theory to proposed regulations of alternative reproduction
in an earlier article. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in
Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2004) (arguing that “welfare of the
child” rationales in favor of greater regulation of alternative reproduction “present an
ethical paradox,” namely, that “the only way to prevent [the negative welfare] effects
[of alternative reproduction] would be to eschew use of the ART that makes the birth
of the child possible. This is the famous philosophical problem that Derek Parfit and
others call ‘the non identity problem’
the person protected never benefits because
they are never born”). For Parfit’s articulation of the Non Identity Problem, see DEREK
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351 79 (1984).
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LOOKING BEYOND BIOLOGY AND GENETICS

Professor Cahn might be right to characterize incest as “dramatic”
when she argues that incest is a “dramatic illustration” of why the law
ought to change;97 incest, after all, is associated first and foremost in
our cultural imagination with a drama.98 However, it is a “dramatic
illustration” that ought to give us pause for several reasons. First, the
incest prevention justification could rest on disgust,99 which is a
morally questionable — and unconstitutional — basis for
lawmaking.100 Second, the incest prevention justification assumes that
97

See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 117, 121.
SOPHOCLES, supra note 46.
99 The genetic harm rationale for regulating alternative reproduction in incest
minimizing ways (and for banning incestuous relationships more generally) rests on
the notion that genetic abnormality, and its physical and mental effects, is singularly
disconcerting, different enough from other kinds of disabilities
like poverty, which
is highly resistant to change
that people might be born “into.” See PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: ECONOMIC MOBILITY ACROSS GENERATIONS 2
(2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs assets/
2012/PursuingAmericanDreampdf.pdf; Born Poor? Half of These Babies Will Spend Most
of Their Childhoods in Poverty; Significantly More Likely to Be Poor 30 Years Later,
URBAN INST. (June 30, 2010), http://www.urban.org/publications/901356.html; see also
Miles Rapoport & Jennifer Wheary, Running in Place: Where the Middle Class and the
Poor Meet, DEMOS (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.demos.org/publication/running place
where middle class and poor meet (summarizing data showing that Americans born
into the lowest income quintile will remain in the bottom 20 percent of all earners for
the rest of their lives and that 70 percent of those from the lowest income quintile will
never make it past the bottom 40 percent of earners). The uniquely troubling
possibility of genetic abnormality might be explained by society’s view of physical
disability and mental retardation, each of which have historically been, and continue
to be, elicitors of discomfort and disgust. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004) (cataloguing the panoply of laws that targeted people with disabilities); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(observing that the mentally disabled were once subjected to a “regime of state
mandated segregation and degradation . . . that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled,
and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow”); Martha Nussbaum, No
Offense: Mere Disgust Should Not Constitute a Cause of Action, AM. LAW. (Oct. 1, 2004),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/nussbaum100104 (arguing that “[t]he mentally
retarded are typically viewed with both fear and disgust”).
100 Several scholars have made a strong case for why we ought to jettison disgust
from lawmaking. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY:
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010) [hereinafter FROM DISGUST TO
HUMANITY]; MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW
20 21 (2004) [hereinafter HIDING FROM HUMANITY] (same); Martha Nussbaum, “Secret
Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 45, 19 55 (Susan
A. Bandes ed., 1999); Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, supra note 3
passim; Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber Predators as Contaminating Forces: The
Language of Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex
98
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prohibiting consensual incest (of the sort captured by the accidental
incest rationale101) is a valid governmental objective. More specifically,
if there were no constitutionally sufficient basis for state bans on
consensual incest between certain family members, as some
commentators have argued,102 then the accidental incest argument
loses force.
This Article, though, focuses on a different reason to reject the
argument from incest: because that argument, like the taboo from
which it derives, is about familial establishment — and not, or at least
not only, about averting biological/genetic harm. Put differently, the
argument from incest is less about genetic abnormality, as it professes
to be, and more about familial abnormality. Less about incest per se,
and more about familial norms. Less about kinship prohibition, and
more about kinship production.
The shift that this Article proposes — from thinking about the incest
prevention justification in terms of genetics and biology to thinking
about it in terms of family norms — makes more sense if one stops to
consider the weaknesses of that justification. As mentioned, the incest
prevention justification is at its heart a genetic or biological argument.
Of the four most common reasons cited in defense of incest prohibitions
— minimizing genetic harm, punishing presumptively non-consensual
sex within a relationship of dependency, discouraging intra-familial
strife, and legislating morality and disgust103 — two of them are
Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 557 62 (2002); Sonia M. Suter, The
“Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of Reproductive Rights:
Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1588
(2008). A series of recent Supreme Court decisions appears to agree, suggesting that
laws infected with disgust are unconstitutional
even if those laws also rest on
constitutionally palatable justifications. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599
(2003) (holding that morality does not constitute a legitimate state interest under the
Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that animus
or hostility against individuals on account of their membership in a class
there,
sexual minorities
does not constitute even a legitimate state interest under the
Equal Protection Clause).
101 Some clarification here is helpful. The relationships between donor conceived
individuals envisioned by supporters of the accidental incest rationale are consensual
in the sense that the sex/intimacy that might occur within those relationships is not
(necessarily) the product of coercion. To be sure, two donor conceived individuals
might lack knowledge of their relatedness, but such ignorance does not vitiate their
consent to the “incestuous” intimacy that might occur between them.
102 See, e.g., DANIEL MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR
PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 119 (2009) (arguing that
not all incest ought to be subject to a criminal or civil ban).
103 For a discussion of these rationales, see CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at
119 121; Markus D. Dubber, Policing Morality: Constitutional Law and the
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inapplicable to donor-conceived families. If a donor-conceived brother
and sister from different families meet in college, fall in love, and
“commit” accidental incest, then there is no concern about nonconsensual sex within a relationship of dependency or about intrafamilial strife because our hypothetical brother and sister were not
raised in the same household. A third possible reason to prohibit incest
and to regulate assisted reproduction in incest-preventative ways — the
legislating morality and disgust rationale — is likely unconstitutional.104
What we are left with, then, is the minimizing genetic/biological harm
rationale as the only immediately plausible basis to regulate assisted
reproduction for incest-related reasons.
If that is right, then the incest prevention justification suffers from
enough weaknesses to prompt an examination of the work that
justification is doing in contemporary discussions about alternative
reproduction. The first weakness is an empirical one: proponents of
that rationale have not shown that the risk of accidental incest
between donor-conceived individuals is great enough to justify their
suggested regulatory reforms as well as the burdens those reforms will
place on users of alternative reproduction.105 The second weakness is a
structural one: the incest prevention justification is plagued with
under-inclusion, both with respect to its ultimate object of concern
(genetic abnormality) and with respect to its immediate object of
concern (accidental incest). At the very least, under-inclusion of this
sort is an invitation to consider what it is about incest that has
captured the attention of policymakers and scholars — indeed, what it
is about incest that explains its atavistic emergence in legal and
political debates over intimate and family life.
First, the incest prevention justification is under-inclusive with
respect to its ultimate purported concern: genetic abnormality and its

Criminalization of Incest, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 737, 742 (2011).
104 See supra notes 99 100 and accompanying text.
105 Other than statements like accidental incest between donor conceived
individuals “can happen” and is “on the minds of many donor conceived children,”
empirical data on the question of how likely it is to happen are lacking in
commentators’ proposals to curtail alternative reproduction for incest preventative
reasons. “[W]ith more than 40,000 children born from donor eggs and sperm last
year,” Cahn notes, “concerns about what is now called ‘inadvertent consanguinity’ are
quite real.” CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 61. What Cahn does not tell us,
though, is how real the threat of accidental incest actually is. Cahn cites to one source
but that source is just a meta analysis of existing mathematical models that makes the
case for why more sophisticated mathematical modeling is necessary. See Neroli
Sawyer & John McDonald, A Review of Mathematical Models Used to Determine Sperm
Donor Limits for Infertility Treatment, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 265, 265 66 (2008).
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physical and mental effects. If genetic abnormalities were so
worrisome, then one would expect commentators to focus on other
situations where reproduction increases the risk of their occurrence,
as when men and women above a certain age reproduce106 or when
individuals with certain genetically-related disorders reproduce.107 No
commentator, however, has recently suggested that the law should
curtail those actors’ procreative freedom in order to prevent congenital
defects in resulting progeny.108 In fact, one of the proposals to alleviate
the gamete shortage that could result from moving to an open donor
regime — the use of older donors, who are reputedly less concerned
with preserving anonymity than their younger counterparts109 —
could itself increase the risk of genetic harm, considering the possible
link between advanced paternal age and certain genetically-related
disorders.110 In other words, genetic harm could flow from the very
solution offered to minimize its risk.
In addition, if the consequences of congenital defects — life
dependency on third-parties, including the state; physical and
psychological pain — were so worrisome, then one would expect
commentators to focus on other situations where reproduction
increases their risk. Poverty is an “inherited” condition that has a
106 For instance, older men and women who reproduce have a higher risk of having
children with certain genetic conditions, including Down Syndrome and autism; for a
woman having a child at age 45, “the probability of Down syndrome alone roughly
matches the 4 percent cumulative risk of birth defects from cousin marriage,” which
are prohibited in 25 states. William Saletan, Incest and Delayed Motherhood, SLATE
(May 19, 2008), http://www.slate.com/blogs/humannature/2008/05/19/incest and
delayed motherhood.html; see also Michele Goodwin, A View From the Cradle: Tort
Law and the Private Regulation of Alternative Reproduction, 59 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1046
(2010) (observing that “[i]n more than 40% of pregnancies involving women over
thirty, chromosomal abnormalities are present in the fetus, and abnormalities rise to
about 70% in women forty and over”).
107 For instance, non related people who are both carriers of a recessive gene that
causes certain autosomal recessive disorders, like Cystic Fibrosis or Tay Sachs disease,
are at an increased risk of having a child with that disorder. See Tay Sachs Disease
Information Page, NAT’L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE (Oct. 6, 2011),
https://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm.
108 This Article says “recently” because sterilization of the mentally disabled was a
practice not only upheld as constitutional in the 1927 Supreme Court case Buck v. Bell
but passionately endorsed by its author, Justice Holmes, who there said: “It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Buck v. Bell has never been overruled.
109 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 95 96 and accompanying text.

210

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 49:183

range of adverse health consequences for those born into it.111 And
yet, no commentator has recently suggested that we directly curtail the
reproductive opportunities of the economically disadvantaged in order
to avoid them.112
Second, the incest prevention justification is under-inclusive with
respect to its immediate purported target: accidental incest between
consanguineous kin. If accidental incest were so concerning, then one
wonders why commentators have not acknowledged other situations
where a law — or its absence — sets the conditions for accidental
incest to occur. For instance, the paternal presumption113 creates the
conditions for accidental incest to occur between biological kin at least
as much as a practice that does not require gamete providers to
disclose their identity to any progeny that result from their donation.
In fact, the paternal presumption arguably creates an even greater risk
of accidental incest than does anonymous sperm donation given that
the paternal presumption applies — or, at least, has traditionally
applied114 — in a context that would not necessarily induce a child to
question her biological origins: heterosexual married parenthood. By
contrast, more and more children conceived from anonymous sperm
today are born into a context that at the very least puts them on
presumptive notice about the existence of other biological progenitors:
single women and lesbian same-sex partners.115 Whereas incest has
111

See supra note 99.
Some legislators have supported indirect restrictions on the reproductive
capacity of women on public assistance by offering those women financial incentives
to use contraception like Norplant. Within two years of Norplant’s approval by the
Food and Drug Administration, legislators in thirteen states had proposed nearly two
dozen bills offering incentives for, or requiring use of, Norplant by women on public
assistance; none of those proposals passed. See generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING
THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY ch. 3 (1997).
113 The common law paternal presumption treats the husband of the woman who
gave birth to a child as the presumed father of that child. While in most states the
paternal presumption may be rebutted with DNA evidence, in some states it continues
to operate as an irrebuttable presumption. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn,
Current Issue in Child Support and Spousal Support, Marriage, Parentage, and Child
Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 224 28 (2011) [hereinafter Current Issue] (discussing the
states that maintain an irrebuttable presumption).
114 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 240 42 (2006) (discussing
the application of the ‘paternal presumption’ of legitimacy to same sex lesbian
couples).
115 See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 21 (stating that “[w]hile there are no
reliable figures on who uses sperm banks, anecdotal evidence suggests that their usage
by heterosexual couples is declining, while usage by single women and lesbians is
increasing”).
112
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recently surfaced as a very real by-product of alternative reproduction
(and as a reason to regulate it), however, it has never once surfaced as
even a distant by-product of one of family law’s “most venerable
doctrines”116 (or as a reason to reform it).117
Similarly, roving sexual inseminators engage in sexual activity that
could easily lead to the birth of hundreds of children who do not
know each other — and who therefore engage in accidental incest.
Indeed, it is entirely plausible that the circumstances motivating
commentators to propose regulations of alternative reproduction
already exist today in the context of sexual reproduction, namely, the
birth of thousands of children who do not know, or who do not really
know, who at least one of their biological progenitors is, and who for
that reason might engage in consanguineous procreation.
“[M]isattributed paternity — believing like Luke Skywalker that your
father is someone other than who he is — is not an insignificant
phenomenon,” Professor Glenn Cohen writes, “with studies
suggesting that it may affect as few as one percent and as many as
thirty percent of the population, with most estimates clustering at two
to five percent of the population.”118 Scientists call this a “nonpaternity event,”119 a phrase which describes the situation (and shock)
that some people confront when they discover, as a result of genetic
testing, that the man whom they long thought was their father is not,

116

Appleton, supra note 114, at 287.
That said, Professors Carbone and Cahn have criticized states that have made it
difficult, if not impossible, for persons to rebut the paternal presumption, although
not because the presumption could lead to accidental incest. See Carbone & Cahn,
Current Issue, supra note 113, at 238 39. Carbone and Cahn have proposed
eliminating the presumption and establishing mandatory paternity testing at a child’s
birth. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1013
(2003) (stating that “in an era in which biological connections are increasingly easy to
determine, parental relationships should be based on truth and certainty rather than
convenience or presumptions”).
118 Cohen, Rethinking Anonymity, supra note 86, at 443; see also MARTHA M.
ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF
FAMILIES 61 (2015) (stating that “[w]hile urban legend holds that as many as 10
percent of children are products of the mother’s extramarital affair, a 2006 study
suggests that mandatory genetic tests would unpleasantly surprise around 2 percent of
husbands”); Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109
MICH. L. REV. 291, 315 n.106 (citing the most accurate misattributed paternity
estimate as between 2 5% of the population).
119 Steve Olson, Who’s Your Daddy?: The Unintended Consequences of Genetic
Screening for Disease, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2007), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2007/07/who s your daddy/305969/.
117
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in fact, their biological progenitor.120 Even if misattributed paternity
affects just one percent of the population — the low end of estimates
— that would mean that of the 4,000,000 children born in 2013 in the
United States,121 40,000 of them are not being fathered by the person
whom they believe is their genetic progenitor.122
Thus contextualized, alternative reproduction’s “slippery slope to
incest” argument is a relatively weak one, as coital reproduction
already makes slippage possible. If accidental incest were such a
terrifying possibility, then one would expect commentators to be
advocating the regulation of the activity that could more frequently
lead to it: sexual procreation. No one, however, has ever seriously
proposed that we regulate sexual procreation in order to thwart
accidental incest in the way that commentators have proposed that we
regulate alternative procreation.123
The incest prevention justification’s under-inclusion could reflect a
belief that non-sexual reproduction is deserving of less constitutional
protection than sexual procreation. Glenn Cohen argues that Naomi
Cahn “would be unlikely to endorse the view that reproduction
through [reproductive] technologies is a ‘lower status’ kind of
120 Of course, because of the paternal presumption that man might still be those
individuals’ legal father, just not their biological progenitor.
121 See BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL., 63 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY
DATA FOR 2013, at 8 (2014), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr63/
nvsr63 02.pdf.
122 As the Supreme Court recognized in Nguyen v. Immigration & Nationalization
Service, it is “[not] always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s
identity.” Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001). Even if mothers have such
identifying information, they are in no way legally obliged to contact the “fathers” of
children born to them if they do not want to; nor are they legally obliged to tell their
children about those men. As Justice Stevens argued in his Caban v. Mohammed
dissent: “In many cases, only the mother knows who sired the child, and it will often be
within her power to withhold that fact.” Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 404 05
(1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). These women are, however,
required to reveal the identity of the father to the government if they apply for public
assistance. Marsha Garrison, Lawmaking for Babymaking: An Interpretative Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 907 n.326 (2000) (stating
that “[p]aternity cooperation rules, which require public assistance applicants to
cooperate in establishing paternity and securing support, necessarily apply only to
public assistance recipients”). It is unclear whether a woman’s failure to disclose a
pregnancy to a man would amount to paternity fraud, as paternity fraud cases are
typically brought by deceived men to disestablish paternity, not to establish it. See
Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument
Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 194 95 (2004).
123 Glenn Cohen has proposed such a registry in (partial) jest. See Cohen,
Rethinking Anonymity, supra note 86, at 444 (stating that “my proposal is meant to
provoke”).
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reproduction, worthy of less protection.”124 Nevertheless, Cohen
continues, Cahn’s arguments in support of mandatory donor registries
— including her incest prevention argument — “might sub silentio
depend on that premise.”125 More relevant to the subject matter of this
Article, numerous federal courts disposing of constitutional challenges
to same-sex marriage prohibitions have found that states’ professed
rationale for those prohibitions — procreation — is under-inclusive in
a way that suggests that procreation is a proxy or “pretext” for
constitutionally impermissible motivation, like moral disapproval or
animus (for either same-sex marriage, homosexuality, or both).126
124 Id. at 445; see also Mary Patricia Byrn & Rebecca Ireland, Anonymously Provided
Sperm and the Constitution, 23 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & L. 1, 20 (2012) (stating that
“[w]hile commentators supporting the ban [on anonymously provided sperm] have
not expressly based their arguments on a lack of a fundamental right to procreate for
persons who conceive via ART, their proposals are implicitly based on this damaging
assumption”).
125 Cohen, Rethinking Anonymity, supra note 86, at 445. In a more recent article,
Professor Cahn argues in explicit terms that sexual and alternative reproduction are
“different enough” to justify different legal treatment of them. In response to the
objection that laws abolishing anonymity in the donor gamete context violate equal
protection because they treat similarly situated procreators differently, Cahn writes:
“The reality is that they are, in fact, different, and different enough to satisfy any level
of constitutional scrutiny.” Naomi Cahn, Do Tell! The Rights of Donor Conceived
Offspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1077, 1106 (2014). The difference, in Cahn’s view, turns
on both sex and third party involvement. She says: “Even children conceived through
a one night stand involve a sexual encounter. By contrast, like adopted children,
donor conceived children require the involvement of someone outside the family, a
third party who is not within the protected sphere of sexually intimate conduct.” Id.
An unpublished paper by the author contests the questionable binaristic logic on
which Cahn’s (and others’) arguments are based. See generally Courtney Megan Cahill,
Reproduction Reconceived (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(work in progress). For other scholars who have critiqued the sexual/non sexual
reproduction binary, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Between the Binaries: Exploring the
Legal Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 93 passim (2015);
Martha M. Ertman, Unexpected Links Between Baby Markets and Intergenerational
Justice, 8 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 271, 272 (2014) (arguing that “more similarities
exist between assisted and coital reproduction than people think, and therefore less
reason for the state to depart from its general tendency to leave private family
decisions to the private realm by interfering in baby making with purchased
gametes”); id. (“Because limits on reproductive technologies involve state meddling in
family building decisions that are all but unthinkable in coital reproduction, justice
requires us to ask why law would impose coercive controls in one case and give
freedom and privacy in the other.”). Professor Ertman elaborates on these arguments
in her recent book, LOVE’S PROMISES. See generally ERTMAN, supra note 118.
126 See, e.g., Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (stating
that “defending the ban on same sex marriage on the ground that the capacity to
procreate is the essence of marriage is the kind of position that, in another context,
might support a finding for pretext,” that “[t]he undeniable truth is that the Florida
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This Article is not suggesting that supporters of the accidental incest
rationale are motivated by animus against non-traditional procreators
or are using incest as a mere pretext for a constitutionally
impermissible purpose. Nor does it take a position on whether the
argument reflects an indefensible assumption that non-sexual
procreation is deserving of less constitutional protection than that of
the sexual variety. Rather, it simply suggests that the weaknesses of
the incest prevention justification, and especially its under-inclusion,
are an invitation to consider that justification’s less obvious
dimensions — moral and normative dimensions that emerge by
situating incest prevention in a broader theoretical and historical
context. That context, as the ensuing Parts show, suggests that incest
emerges atavistically in debates over intimate and family life not
because of persistent concerns about biology and genetic harm but
rather because of persistent concerns about the structure and
substance of the family.
The following Parts provide that context. They argue that the incest
prevention rationale’s principal function mirrors that of the taboo
from which it emanates — familial establishment — and that viewing
the incest prevention rationale through an establishment lens provides
a basis for rejecting it on both normative and constitutional grounds.
In elucidating the rich theoretical and legal ancestry of the
contemporary incest prevention justification, the next Parts reveal the
normative framework in which that argument is operating — as well
as the values, constitutional and otherwise, at stake behind its
deployment in debates over alternative reproduction.
III. THE INCEST TABOO AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KINSHIP
This Part considers the incest taboo’s productive, or establishment,
function both in theory and in practice. Its objective is to shift the
focus away from what the incest taboo prohibits (romance within the
family) and toward what it creates (a romance about the family). All
law simultaneously prohibits and produces; the incest taboo — the
supreme law of the family — is no different. In this sense, the incest
taboo serves a positive function that philosopher Michel Foucault
attributes to power more generally. He says:

ban on same sex marriage stems entirely, or almost entirely, from moral disapproval
of the practice,” and citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), for the
proposition that “moral disapproval, standing alone, cannot sustain a provision of this
kind”).
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We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power
in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it
‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of
him belong to this production.127
It is this Part’s objective to encourage readers to start thinking about
the incest taboo, and the legal arguments that flow from it, in terms of
a “production.” Our cultural engagement with the incest taboo derives
from one kind of production: the tragedy Oedipus Rex. The actual
deployment of the incest taboo effectuates another kind of production:
ideal forms of kinship. Section A summarizes the arguments of
theorists who have approached the incest taboo in productive terms
and who have conceptualized it as a way to establish the family (rather
than as a way to avoid intra-familial sexual unions and their possible
genetic consequences). Section B considers how the incest taboo has
been used throughout the history of American family law in a
productive way to establish the ideal family.
A. The Incest Taboo’s Establishment Function in Theory
We can hardly be surprised if incest is being mobilized today in
debates over alternative reproduction in a way that establishes the
family, as establishment is precisely the kind of work that the incest
taboo does. As several influential theorists have argued, the incest
taboo is at least as much — if not more — about establishment as it is
about prohibition. Some argue that it establishes gender, sexual
identity, and society more generally. Others maintain that it
establishes contemporary social relations (and hierarchies) between
men and women. And still others argue that it establishes the family
— and that it is increasingly being used in legal and political settings
to do just that.
For Freud and his intellectual descendants in the psychoanalytic
tradition, the incest taboo was instrumental in establishing “normal”
gender and sexual identity. For them, the primal law against parentchild romance, otherwise known as the Oedipal complex, was as much
about establishing gender and sexual identity as it was about
prohibiting intra-familial romance.128 A successful resolution of the
127 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 194 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
128 The Oedipal complex was used by Freud and his descendants to explain (and
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complex, they maintained, resulted in the proper formation of gender
identity — masculinity for boys and femininity for girls.129 It also
resulted in heterosexuality. “Psychoanalytic theory has always
recognized the productive function of the incest taboo,” philosopher
Judith Butler writes. “[I]t is what creates heterosexual desire and
discrete gender identity.”130
mandate) the psychosexual development of boys and girls. See Rubin, supra note 16,
at 189 (stating that the “Oedipal complex is an apparatus for the production of sexual
personality”). According to it, a boy initially desires his mother but eventually turns
away from her and comes to identify with his father out of a castration fear. See id. at
193 (boys renounce the mothers “for fear that otherwise [their] father[s] would
castrate [them] (refuse to give [them] the phallus and make [them become] girl[s])”);
id. at 193 (“The boy exchanges his mother for the phallus. . . . The only thing required
of him is a little patience. He retains his initial libidinal organization and the sex of his
original love object. The social contract to which he has agreed will eventually
recognize his own rights and provide him with a woman of his own.”). A girl also
initially desires her mother, but eventually turns away from her and becomes desirous
of her father. As with the boy and his mother, however, the girl must in time repress
her desire for the opposite sex parent (father) and identify with the same sex parent
(mother). See id. For Freud’s description of the Oedipal conflict, see SIGMUND FREUD,
THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 383 84, 408 10 (James Strachey ed. & trans., Basic
Books 2010) (1955); SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 26 36 (James Strachey ed.,
Joan Riviere trans., 1960); SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
PSYCHOANALYSIS 184 85, 289 96 (Joan Riviere trans., 1943).
129 Freudian psychoanalysis posits that a successful resolution of the Oedipal
complex occurs after children identify with their same sex parent. See CHARLES W.
SOCARIDES, THE OVERT HOMOSEXUAL 74 76 (1968). Charles Socarides was a prominent
psychiatrist and Freudian psychoanalyst who wrote several books on (and against)
homosexuality and who was the co founder, along with Joseph Nicolosi and Benjamin
Kaufman, in 1992 of the National Association for Research and Therapy of
Homosexuality (“NARTH”), whose primary mission is to support gay conversion
therapy. See WAYNE BESEN, ANYTHING BUT STRAIGHT: UNMASKING THE SCANDALS AND LIES
BEHIND THE EX GAY MYTH 136 (2003); Margalit Fox, Charles W. Socarides, Psychiatrist
and Psychoanalyst, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/12/28/nyregion/28socarides.html. Socarides and his colleagues posited that a
child’s failure to identify with his same sex parent would lead to homosexuality. See
SOCARIDES, supra, at 38 (stating that “[t]he family of the homosexual is usually a
female dominated environment wherein the father was absent, weak, detached or
sadistic. . . . The father’s inaccessibility to the boy contributed to the difficulty in
making a masculine identification”). A central tenet of NARTH is that men “become”
gay, in part, because of absent fathers. See, e.g., Johanna K. Tabin, Father Hunger and
Homosexuality, NARTH SCI. ADVISORY COMM. (Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.narth.org/
docs/fatherhunger2.html. Charles Socarides’ son Richard Socarides is an attorney,
LGBT rights activist, and former advisor to President Clinton on LGBT issues. See
RICHARD SOCARIDES, http://richardsocarides.com/ (last visited July 16, 2015).
130 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 97
(1999) [hereinafter GENDER TROUBLE]; see also id. at 96 (stating that “[t]he incest
taboo is the juridical law that is said both to prohibit incestuous desires and to
construct certain gendered subjectivities through the mechanism of compulsory
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No less emphatic about the incest taboo’s “productive function” was
structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, who argued in his
master work, The Elementary Structures of Kinship,131 that the incest
taboo was responsible for no less than society itself. There, LéviStrauss repeatedly underscores the productive rather than the
prohibitive aspects of the taboo, as when he remarks that incest
prohibitions “are prohibitions only secondarily and derivatively.
Rather than a prohibition on a certain category of persons,” he says,
the incest taboo is a “prescription directed towards another
category.”132 He claims that intra-family marriage is “scarcely
conceivable”133 for persons in pre-modern society134 not because it
violates some intuitive moral sense, but rather because it frustrates the
establishment of social networks.135 Incest is “socially absurd before it
is morally culpable,” he writes.136
The respective fathers of psychoanalysis and structural anthropology
thus together recognized — and, in the case of Lévi-Strauss, insisted
upon — the incest taboo’s productive dimension. Elaborating on their
theories, feminist philosopher Gayle Rubin argues that the incest
taboo has been responsible for establishing not just sexual identity and
society, but also the social relations of sex and gender.137 She contends
identification”) (emphasis added); Rubin, supra note 16, at 189 (stating that “[i]n the
most general terms, the Oedipal complex is a machine which fashions the appropriate
forms of sexual individuals”).
131 CLAUDE LÉVI STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 490 (Rodney
Needham ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans., Beacon Press
1969) (1949).
132 Id. at 485; see also id. at 51 (“[E]very negative stipulation of the [incest]
prohibition has its counterpart. The prohibition is tantamount to an obligation, and
renunciation gives rise to a counter claim.”).
133 Id. at 485.
134 These are the persons who comprise Lévi Strauss’s data set.
135 Lévi Strauss recounts the response given by an Arapesh man to Margaret Meade
when the latter asked him why men did not marry their sisters
a response that
Lévi Strauss offers as proof of the incest taboo’s socially productive purpose: “‘What,
you would like to marry your sister! What is the matter with you anyway? Don’t you
want a brother in law? . . . With whom will you hunt, with whom will you garden,
whom will you go to visit?’” Id. at 485. Incest is “scarcely conceivable” for this man,
Lévi Strauss says, because it frustrates the formation of social networks, not because it
is inherently repulsive. Id.; see also Rubin, supra note 16, at 173 74 (stating that “in
general sense [Lévi Strauss’s] argument is that the taboo on incest results in a wide
network of relations, a set of people whose connections with one another are a kinship
structure”).
136 LÉVI STRAUSS, supra note 131, at 485.
137 Rubin, supra note 16, at 183 (stating that “some basic generalities about the
organization of human sexuality can be derived from an exegesis of Lévi Strauss’s
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that it is a mistake to view the incest taboo in prohibitive or negative
terms; “incest taboos . . . cannot be explained as having the aim of
preventing the occurrence of genetically close matings,” she insists.138
Rather, one must view the taboo through an establishment lens, one
which focuses less on what the taboo prohibits and more on what it
creates: the “sex/gender system,” which Rubin defines as “the set of
arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into
products of human activity.”139
Rubin argues that the sex/gender system is a by-product of the
incest taboo and of the Freudian contention that the taboo establishes
proper gender alignment and heterosexuality.140 In her view, the very
thing that was once used to establish society and sexual identity — the
incest taboo — is still being used in the modern era to establish and
govern social relations between men and women.141 “The kinds of
relationships of sexuality established in the dim human past,” Rubin
says, “still dominate our sexual lives, our ideas about men and women,
and the ways we raise our children.”142 For this reason, she insists, to
achieve equality women must first imagine a world where “the entire
Oedipal drama would be a relic.”143 Women must “[u]nite,” she says,
“to [o]ff the Oedipal [r]esidue of [c]ulture.”144

theories of kinship. These are the incest taboo, obligatory heterosexuality, and an
asymmetric division of the sexes”); see also id. at 180 (arguing that “the incest taboo
presupposes a prior, less articulate taboo on homosexuality” because “[a] prohibition
against some heterosexual unions assumes a taboo against non heterosexual [ones]”);
id. at 177 (stating that “[i]f Lévi Strauss is correct in seeing the exchange of women as
a fundamental principle of kinship, the subordination of women can be seen as a
product of the relationships by which sex and gender are organized and produced”).
138 Id. at 173.
139 Id. at 159.
140 See id. at 183; see also BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 130, at 83 84
(arguing that the incest taboo “produces heterosexuality, and acts not merely as a
negative or exclusionary code, but as a sanction and, most pertinently, as a law of
discourse, distinguishing the speakable from the unspeakable . . . the legitimate from
the illegitimate”).
141 See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 130, at 93 (stating that “Rubin
understands psychoanalysis . . . to complement Lévi Strauss’s description of kinship
relations”); see also Rubin, supra note 16, at 188 (stating that “psychoanalysis is the
study of the traces left in the psyches of individuals as a result of their conscription
into systems of kinship”); id. at 198 (observing that “our sex/gender system is still
organized by the principles outlined by Lévi Strauss, despite the entirely nonmodern
character of his data base”).
142 Rubin, supra note 16, at 199.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 198.
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More recently, Judith Butler has viewed the incest taboo in
establishment terms, arguing that it is often used in contemporary
legal and political debates to establish both what the family is and
what it ought to be. Where Rubin argues that the incest taboo
establishes our ideas about sex, gender, and sexuality, Judith Butler
argues that it establishes our ideas about the family. Incest and its
persistent threat, she suggests, have been mobilized by critics of nontraditional families in myriad ways to justify legal restrictions on them,
including gay marriage restrictions and restrictions on alternative
reproduction.145
Sometimes, for instance, incest is presented by critics of nontraditional families as an analogue to other forms of deviant kinship.
Butler writes:
[W]hat concerns me most is that the term “incest” is
overinclusive; that the departure from sexual normalcy it
signifies blurs too easily with other kinds of departures. Incest is
considered shameful, which is one reason it is so difficult to
articulate, but to what extent does it become stigmatized as a
sexual irregularity that is terrifying, repulsive, unthinkable in
the ways that other departures from normative exogamic
heterosexuality are?146
Or, as she elsewhere suggests:
[T]he horror of incest, the moral revulsion it compels in some,
is not that far afield from the same horror and revulsion felt
toward lesbian and gay sex, and is not unrelated to the intense
moral condemnation of voluntary single parenting, or gay
parenting, or parenting arrangements with more than two
adults involved (practices that can be used as evidence to
support a claim to remove a child from the custody of the
parent in several states in the United States). These various
modes in which the oedipal mandate fails to produce normative
family all risk entering into the metonymy of that moralized

145 For a recent commentary on Butler’s work on the incest taboo and the
establishment of kinship, see generally Terrell Carver & Samuel A. Chambers, Kinship
Trouble: Antigone’s Claim and the Politics of Heteronormativity, 3 POLITICS & GENDER
427 (2007).
146 JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 157 (2004) [hereinafter UNDOING GENDER]
(emphasis added).
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sexual horror that is perhaps most fundamentally associated with
incest.147
Other times, Butler argues, incest is presented by critics of nontraditional families as their tragic result. Critics of gay parenthood, for
instance, “commonly maintain that alternative kinship arrangements
attempt to revise psychic structures in ways that lead to tragedy again,
figured incessantly as the tragedy of and for the child.”148 Their
arguments, she says, portend that “any children raised in a gay family
[will] run the . . . threat of psychosis, as if some structure, necessarily
named ‘Mother’ and necessarily named ‘Father,’” were required for
“normal” psychological development.149
These kinds of arguments, which pervade anti-same-sex marriage
advocacy as well as arguments against alternative reproduction and
non-biological parenthood,150 position the incest taboo and normative
kinship in a feedback loop. The incest taboo creates normative kinship
(proper gender alignment, heterosexuality, and, eventually, dualgender parenthood); normative kinship, in turn, insures that the
incest taboo is working — and that children will continue to fall in
love with the right person. Under this view, non-traditional kinship,
like gay parenting, begets non-traditional kinship, including incest
and homosexuality. By contrast, traditional kinship — straight
parenting — begets traditional kinship, including extra-familial
intimacy and heterosexuality. Thus understood, the argument that gay
marriage leads to incest,151 or that gay parents create gay children,152
begins to make more sense.
It is against this backdrop that Butler considers the incest taboo’s
“establishment” dimension. She says:

147 BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM, supra note 19, at 71 (emphasis added); see also
BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, supra note 146, at 160 (observing that the incest taboo
“exposes the aberration in normative kinship”).
148 BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM, supra note 19, at 70 (emphasis added).
149 Id.
150 The idea that same sex marriage harms children because it fails to provide them
with dual gender parenting pervades anti same sex marriage advocacy. See NeJaime,
Marriage, Biology, supra note 31, at 91; Deborah Widiss, Elizabeth N. Rosenblatt &
Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same Sex Marriage Jurisprudence,
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 490 92 (2007).
151 See Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, supra note 3, at 1550 61
(surveying the slippery slope to incest argument in anti marriage equality advocacy).
152 See Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the
Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 294 311 (2009).
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It is, of course, one function of the incest taboo to prohibit
sexual exchange among kin relations or, rather, to establish kin
relations precisely on the basis of those taboos. The question,
however, is whether the incest taboo has also been mobilized to
establish certain forms of kinship as the only intelligible and
livable ones.153
Butler returns to this “establishment” idea in a more recent work,
where she writes: “What I want to underscore here is the use of
Oedipus to establish a certain conception of culture that has rather
narrow consequences for . . . gender and sexual arrangements.”154 The
“law that would secure the incest taboo as the foundation of symbolic
family structures,” she says, “states the universality of the incest taboo
as well as its necessary symbolic consequences.”155 One of those
consequences is the establishment of the ideal household and the
simultaneous denigration “of lesbian and gay forms of parenting,
single-mother households, [and] blended family arrangements in
which there may be more than one mother or father.”156
In elucidating the incest taboo’s establishment function, Butler
places herself in a line of thinkers that includes Freud (and his
descendants), Lévi-Strauss, and Rubin, all of whom have similarly
understood the taboo in productive terms. They identified the ways in
which it establishes sexual identity, society, and the social relations
between men and women. She furthers their project by identifying the
ways in which it establishes the family.157
B. The Incest Taboo’s Establishment Function in Practice
Butler’s insight that the incest taboo has been used to establish
normative kinship no less than it has been used to prohibit intra153

BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM, supra note 19, at 70 (emphasis added).
BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, supra note 146, at 119.
155 Id. at 158.
156 Id.
157 Like Rubin, Butler is interested in the way in which old theories about incest
have been “revived and redeployed” in debates over non traditional kinship. Id. at
119. It is important to note, however, that Butler does not hold Lévi Strauss
accountable for the conservative uses to which his theory of the incest taboo has been
put, particularly by contemporary writers in these debates. She says: “My point is less
to hold the views of Lévi Strauss responsible for the terms of the present debate [over
gay parenting] than to ask what purpose the reanimation of these views serves within
the contemporary political horizon, considering that in anthropology, the Lévi
Straussian views promulgated in the late 1940s are generally considered surpassed and
are no longer owned in the same form by Lévi Strauss himself.” Id.
154
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familial romance helps explain the dogged persistence of incest-based
arguments in American family law. The taboo dominated family law
debates in the past, and, as this Article has already shown, it continues
to do so today.
For instance, nineteenth-century courts routinely upheld civil and
criminal anti-miscegenation laws by adverting to incest; as the
Tennessee Supreme Court declared in 1872, recognizing inter-racial
marriage would result in a situation where “the father [was] living
with his daughter, the son with the mother, the brother with the
sister.”158 More recently, incest has played a role in arguments against
legalizing same-sex intimacy159 and same-sex marriage;160 it even
surfaced as a concern of Justice Sotomayor — a left-leaning Justice —
in oral arguments in United States v. Windsor.161 Finally, incest has
figured in arguments against certain methods of alternative
reproduction, including anonymous gamete donation (as we have
already seen)162 and human reproductive cloning.163 If Butler is right,
158 State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872). For incest’s role in slippery slope rhetoric
against inter racial relationships, see Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope
Rhetoric, supra note 3, at 1555 57. In the nineteenth century miscegenation and incest
were not just causally related
such that the recognition of the former was thought
to lead inexorably to the recognition of the latter
but interchangeable. See id. at
1588 91.
159 No less an authority than the Supreme Court of the United States adverted to
incest in support of sodomy bans in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 96 (1986).
Justice Scalia inveighed against this same possibility in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent, 539
U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), as did then Senator Rick Santorum in the
months leading up to that landmark decision. See Excerpt from Santorum Interview,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 23, 2003, 10:37 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2003 04 23 santorum excerpt x.htm.
160 More recently, incest has resurfaced in the wake of the marriage equality
movement. See Bo Suh, Texas Legislators Argue Same Sex Marriage Leads to Incest,
Polygamy, Bestiality, HRC BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/texas
legislators argue same sex marriage leads to incest polygamy pedophil. Not all courts
agree. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 829 n.52 (2008) (rejecting the
slippery slope from same sex marriage to incest argument).
161 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 54 69 and accompanying text. Incest became a concern for
those suspicious of artificial insemination in the 1950s and 1960s. See supra notes 38
40 and accompanying text. Although alternative insemination existed well before the
twentieth century, see Bernstein, Socio Legal Acceptance, supra note 39, at 1048, it did
not raise incest fears until the middle of the twentieth century, and even then those
fears were raised primarily by legal scholars, not the general public. See id. at n.17. For
an ethnographical study of one town’s struggle with incest anxiety arising from the
advent of new reproductive technologies, see generally Jeanette Edwards,
Incorporating Incest: Gamete, Body and Relation in Assisted Conception, 10 J. ROYAL
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 755 (2004).
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then incest’s continual emergence in American family law indicates a
persistent need to establish the family and to discipline domestic
outliers, particularly during moments when the family’s traditional
form is subject to change.164 Even as the taboo exits one proverbial
stage (the miscegenation context), it quite predictably reappears on
another (the alternative reproduction context).
Significantly, even though actors have invoked the incest taboo as a
reason not to recognize non-traditional kinship, incest, it seems, is
rarely those actors’ chief concern. For instance, racist radicals
consistently raised the specter of incest as a reason to prohibit interracial relationships. If anything, however, anti-miscegenation laws
increased, not decreased, the likelihood of incest. In mandating intraracial intimacy, anti-miscegenation laws reduced the number of
available partners in the dating pool for everyone but especially for
whites, who were prohibited from maintaining intimate relationships
with anyone but themselves.165 Moreover, anti-miscegenation laws
163 The late Leon Kass offered incest as a reason to limit human reproductive
cloning, asking: “What will happen when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes
the spitting image of the woman Daddy once fell in love with?” Human Cloning:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. 48 (2001) (statement of Leon R. Kass), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG 107shrg88708/pdf/CHRG 107shrg88708.pdf;
see also Science and Ethics of Human Cloning: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci.,
Tech., and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. 33 41
(2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG 108shrg95238/pdf/CHRG
108shrg95238.pdf. In Kass’s view, human reproductive cloning not only precipitates
incest but is tantamount to it in the “repugnance” that it elicits. He says: “Can anyone
really give an argument fully adequate to the horror which is father daughter incest
(even with consent) . . . ? The repugnance at human cloning belongs in that category.”
LEON KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 18 (1998).
164 Incest fears have also been provoked by changes in cultural conceptions of the
family and by economic changes in society more generally. See Ruth Perry, Incest as
the Meaning of the Gothic Novel, 39 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 261, 263 64 (1998)
(explaining the prevalence of incest themes in numerous eighteenth century texts as a
reflection of writers’ keen awareness of the transformation of the family that was
taking place at this time and of the new realities of commercialism). In some
eighteenth century texts, incest was idealized and romanticized. See BUTLER, UNDOING
GENDER, supra note 146, at 159 (observing that “brother/sister incest in eighteenth
century literature . . . sometimes appears as idyllic”).
165 For instance, the anti miscegenation law at issue in Loving v. Virginia prohibited
“any white person [from] intermarry[ing] with a colored person, or any colored
person [from] intermarry[ing] with a white person,” but allowed any “colored person”
to marry any other “colored person.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). Indeed,
it was for this reason that the Supreme Court found that Virginia’s anti miscegenation
statute was nothing more than an endorsement of White Supremacy. See id. at 11.
Commentators have also observed the connections between incest and laws against
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created a culture of secrecy around the very thing — miscegenation —
that was prohibited yet also widely practiced; such secrecy, in turn,
created the conditions for incest to occur.166 These inconsistencies
between rhetoric and reality have prompted some scholars to
speculate that racists deployed incest in arguments against
miscegenation not because they were really worried about intra-family
romance and its deleterious genetic consequences. Rather, these
scholars suggest, racists deployed incest in anti-miscegenation
arguments because incest had the power to “emotionalize” the
miscegenation issue.167 Moreover, incest functioned as a “metaphor”
for racist radicals’ true horror: inter-racial intimacy and
reproduction.168
Similarly, consider the role that incest has more recently played in
driving arguments against marriage equality for same-sex couples. As
mentioned above, incest routinely appears at the bottom of the
slippery slope down which same-sex marriage will putatively lead the
nation.169 Remarkably, though, courts in the same state have at once
recognized what would otherwise qualify as an incestuous marriage in
their jurisdiction — first-cousin-marriage — and used the possibility
of that marriage in that state as one of the many reasons to reject
same-sex couple plaintiffs’ constitutional claims to marriage equality.
For instance, in 2014, a federal district court in New Orleans
refused to find that same-sex marriage was a fundamental right under
the federal Constitution, reasoning, in part, that were the court to find
that a broad right to marry existed under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state would be unable to regulate marriages that cause “significant
inter racial intimacy. See BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, supra note 146, at 122 (observing
that “the incest taboo mandates exogamy, but the taboo against miscegenation limits
the exogamy that the incest taboo mandates”); WERNER SOLLORS, NEITHER BLACK NOR
WHITE YET BOTH 322 (1997) (observing that “since miscegenation must be avoided at
all cost, incest (racially enlarged) becomes an ideal almost by necessity”).
166 See SOLLORS, supra note 165, at 303 (observing that “the possibility of sibling
incest in a younger generation [often resulted] from the secrecy of miscegenation of
[the prior generation of] elders”); id. at 318 (stating that “[i]ncest is horrifying, and
the fact that miscegenation takes place outside of legal sanctions makes this terrible
event more likely”); Zanita E. Fenton, An Essay on Slavery’s Hidden Legacy: Social
Hysteria and Structural Condonation of Incest, 55 HOW. L.J. 319, 321 (2012) (observing
and documenting the causal relationship between anti miscegenation laws and incest).
167 SOLLORS, supra note 165, at 316.
168 For “racist radicals,” Sollors contends, incest functioned as “the perfect
metaphor for expressing their horror” over inter racial intimacy. Miscegenation was
the “true horror,” and incest merely the vehicle “through which [that] horror [could]
be . . . expressed.” Id. at 320.
169 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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societal harms,” including “marriages between . . . first cousins.”170
Just a few years earlier, however, a Louisiana court refused to apply
that state’s strong public policy against first-cousin marriage to an
Iranian first-cousin marriage, reasoning that first-cousin “marriages
are not so ‘odious’ as to violate a strong public policy of this state.”171
That the threat of incest subsists as a reason to prevent same-sex
marriage in a state where actual incest is legally recognized raises the
question of what incest is doing in arguments over same-sex marriage.
Indeed, the role that incest once played in sustaining criminal antimiscegenation laws, and continues to play in shoring up marriage
inequality, suggests that incest often functions as a placeholder for
anxiety over something other than incest — often enough to prove
Gayle Rubin’s and Judith Butler’s point that incest anxiety is rarely
about incest and its biological consequences.172 In their view, the
incest taboo is typically mobilized to establish the ideal family rather
than to prevent incest, and incest anxiety is typically a proxy for
another set of concerns — concerns that have little to do with incest
and that usually relate to familial, rather than to genetic,
abnormality.173
170

Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 922 n.13 (E.D. La. 2014).
Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731, 749 50 (La. Ct. App. 2008); see also
Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 1422, 1438 (2012) (arguing that “while states nominally retain the right to bar
recognition of strongly disapproved marriages [under the public policy exception], in
practice the modern trend has been in favor of validating marriages whenever
possible. . . . Only with same sex marriages have states imposed emphatic and
inflexible rules of nonrecognition”).
172 As Rubin puts it, “incest taboos . . . cannot be explained as having the aim of
preventing the occurrence of genetically close matings.” Rubin, supra note 16, at 173.
173 Oxford historian Sybil Wolfram makes a somewhat related point in her
fascinating study of English incest laws, which, she posits, were not motivated by genetic
concerns but rather by shifts in “popular conceptions of kinship.” SYBIL WOLFRAM, IN
LAWS AND OUTLAWS: KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 146 (1987). She says:
171

[T]he use of the biological ill effects of in breeding in political settings
followed, rather than preceded, the replacement of the old categories of
consanguinity and affinity by consanguinity alone as the basis for the
prohibition, and it seems likely that the voicing of the belief, if not the belief
itself, was a consequence of the severing of affinity from consanguinity. The
sequence of events is not that scientific discovery created the belief in the
biological ill effects of in breeding and the belief in turn altered the law and
common thinking towards resting the law on consanguinity (alone). Rather,
after the law and popular conceptions of kinship had changed, an old belief
(that incest produces idiot children) in a new scientific guise (that this
occurs by biological mechanisms), became a useful tool.
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Today’s version of the Oedipal drama — the accidental incest
prevention rationale — is similar. It, too, signifies concerns other than
incest. And it, too, is being used to establish the family.
IV. THE INCEST PREVENTION JUSTIFICATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF KINSHIP
Building on the connections between incest and establishment that
were made in the previous Part, this Part now turns to the more specific
and concrete ways in which incest establishes the family in the context
of alternative reproduction. Specifically, it elucidates two kinds of
establishment that follow from the deployment of the incest prevention
justification in the alternative procreation setting. Section A argues that
the incest prevention justification establishes the traditional family —
married parents and their biological children, sexually conceived — as
the ideal family. Section B argues that the incest prevention justification
establishes the donor network as a family.
A. Establishing the Traditional Family as the Ideal Family
Establishing the traditional, nuclear family is the avowed goal of
some of those who embrace the incest prevention justification as a
reason to regulate alternative reproduction. Consider in this regard the
Institute for American Values, whose invocation of the incest
prevention justification is just one aspect of a larger regulatory vision
that advocates the elimination of alternative reproduction for those
who cannot replicate biological, dual-gendered parenthood. For the
Institute and its adherents, incest prevention intersects and overlaps
with other arguments in favor of regulating alternative reproduction in
order to reproduce the traditional family.
For example, in addition to discussing the incestuous consequences
of anonymous sperm donation, the Institute also champions what it
conceives to be the traditional family. The authors open the section of
One Parent or Five that addresses single mothers by choice by
celebrating marriage and family:

Id. Wolfram argues that something other than genetic concerns prompted English
legislators in the early twentieth century to press for decreased regulation of affinity
(or marriage ) based relationships. This Article makes a similar (but opposite) point,
namely, that something other than genetic concerns
indeed, something other than
incest
is prompting commentators today to argue in favor of increased regulation of
certain aspects of alternative reproduction.
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When at all possible, the married mother and father usually
opt to conceive children the old-fashioned way, through
sexual intercourse (or what our parents’ generation quaintly
called ‘making love’). The married mother and father can be
found pretty much everywhere, from the parks of San
Francisco and Seattle to the streets of the edgiest
neighborhoods of New York. Diverse and resilient, the married
mother and father family has for millennia put down roots
everywhere in the world. Generally thriving wherever planted,
the fruit this family produces — children — is among the
hardiest and healthiest in the world.174
Similar remarks recur throughout other publications by the primary
author of One Parent or Five, Elizabeth Marquardt, who has argued in
various media outlets against the deliberate creation of “motherless”
and “fatherless” families through practices like anonymous egg and
sperm donation to same-sex couples. For instance, in one recent
Atlantic piece, Do Mothers Matter?,175 Marquardt argues that
“surrogacy and egg donation . . . are bringing into the world a class of
children beset by confusion, depression, and loss.”176 She there
presents the stories of men — mostly gay — who have used surrogates
and anonymous egg donors to have children. Playing on the common
anti-gay stereotype of the affluent gay man,177 Marquardt queries:
“Generally moneyed and armed with a team of baby nurses, nannies,
and house cleaners, most of these fathers probably do fine in
providing material comfort, opportunity, and a loving home for the
children. But what about the children? Do their mothers matter to
them?”178 Marquardt laments the “equal opportunity run on
deliberately conceiving motherless children,” characterizing “the
practices of surrogacy and [anonymous] egg donation” as a “tragedy”
on par with other situations where children are maternally bereft, as
174

MARQUARDT, ONE PARENT OR FIVE, supra note 60, at 23.
Elizabeth Marquardt, Do Mothers Matter?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2012), http://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/02/do mothers matter/252676/ [hereinafter
Do Mothers Matter?]; see also Karen Clark & Elizabeth Marquardt, The Sperm Donor
Kids Are Not Really All Right, SLATE (June 14, 2010), http://www.slate.com/
articles/double x/doublex/2010/06/the spermdonor kids are not really all right.html;
Elizabeth Marquardt, Sperm Donor Kids Speak Out: Our Biological Dads Matter to Us,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth
marquardt/anonymouslyconceived youn b 810463.html.
176 Marquardt, Do Mothers Matter?, supra note 175.
177 Id.
178 Id.
175
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when “children have been denied their mothers because of class biases
. . . racial and ethnic biases . . . [or] as part of severe civil conflict.”179
Similar remarks appear throughout amicus briefs submitted to the
Supreme Court in recent marriage equality cases. These briefs oppose
marriage for same-sex couples and cite to the Institute’s publications
on alternative reproduction as authority for arguments in support of
traditional marriage. For instance, one brief submitted to the Supreme
Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor cites to
My Daddy’s Name is Donor for the proposition that there are
“psychological benefits associated with being raised by one’s biological
[mother and father].”180 Another cites to that same publication when
identifying the perils of “redefining marriage in a way that de-links
sex, marriage and children.”181 While the Institute might no longer
oppose gay marriage,182 its publications on alternative reproduction
have been increasingly cited by gay marriage opponents.
On this latter point, it is worth considering that the Institute has
turned to the same arguments that it once used against same-sex
marriage to argue against certain aspects of alternative reproduction.
For example, in testifying against same-sex marriage during the federal
trial in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,183 David Blankenhorn averred that
Proposition 8 was constitutional because same-sex marriage could not
replicate the biological family; as he stated: children have a right “to
know and be known by the two people who brought [them] into this
world.”184 Similarly, in an earlier speech delivered to the Danish
Institute for Human Rights, Blankenhorn warned of the negative
consequences that same-sex marriage would have on biological, dualgendered parenthood, arguing that equal marriage rights for same-sex
couples would not only further “the marketization and
commodification of human reproduction” but also “erase[] the
179

Id.
Amicus Curiae Brief of Coalition for the Protection of Marriage in Support of
Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and
Supporting Reversal at 23, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12
144) & United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12 307).
181 Brief of Amicus Curiae Helen M. Alvaré in Support of Hollingsworth and
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal at 23,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12 144) & United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12 307).
182 See supra notes 51 53.
183 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry v.
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
184 Transcript of Proceedings at 2745, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09 2292 VRW).
180
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biological basis of parenthood from law” and frustrate every child’s
“right to a natural biological heritage, defined as the union of the
father’s sperm and the mother’s egg.”185
Significantly, Blankenhorn repeats these exact sentiments in the
recent New York Times opinion piece in which he announces his
support for same-sex marriage. Blankenhorn concludes that Op-Ed by
asking people to stop fighting against same-sex marriage and to start
supporting biological parenthood: “Can we discuss whether both gays
and straight people should think twice before denying children born
through artificial reproductive technology the right to know and be
known by their biological parents?”186 He also there states that “[n]o
same-sex couple, married or not, can ever under any circumstances
combine biological, social and legal parenthood into one bond” and
that same-sex marriage “effaces [the] gift” that marriage ought to
bestow on a child: guaranteeing that “[t]he man and the woman
whose sexual union made [the child] will also be there to love and
raise [the child].”187 Nevertheless, Blankenhorn says in his Op-Ed,
marriage equality for gays and lesbians is an institution that he now
supports.
Remarks like these suggest that alternative reproduction has become
the new resting place for Blankenhorn’s (and the Institute’s) anxiety
over unconventional kinship. They also suggest that conservatives like
Blankenhorn who now support marriage equality favor a cabined and
contained right to marry rather than a more expansive right to familial
self-definition — the sort of right that has emerged from recent

185 David Blankenhorn, The Rights of Children and the Redefinition of Parenthood,
AM. VALUES 5 7 (June 2, 2005), available at http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/
family humanrights.pdf.
186 Blankenhorn, supra note 2. It is hard to say what Blankenhorn intends with this
concluding plea. On the one hand, he could, like Naomi Cahn, simply be making an
argument for eliminating anonymous gamete donation and for giving donor conceived
children the opportunity to know who their biological progenitors are. On the other
hand, he could be making an argument for abolishing all gamete donation, thereby
eliminating the conditions which help create non biological parenthood in the first
place. Under this latter view, children ought to be given the “gift” of being raised by
and not just knowing
their biological progenitors. Id. (stating that “a[t] the level
of first principles, gay marriage effaces [the] gift” of “unit[ing] the biological, social
and legal components of parenthood into one lasting bond”). This second possibility
seems more plausible than the first, given that Blankenhorn and his Institute have
argued against non biological parenthood writ large in the above discussed
publications and not just against certain aspects of it, like anonymity in gamete
donation.
187 Id.
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marriage equality jurisprudence, as argued below.188 The same
arguments that were once used to establish the traditional family in
the same-sex marriage context, including the incest prevention
justification, are now being used to establish that same family in the
alternative reproduction context. To be sure, the incest prevention
justification sounds more objective and neutral than some of the more
transparently ideological arguments against non-traditional kinship
discussed above. However, that justification’s context and history
suggest that it is being mobilized (by some actors) to establish the
same kind of family that those more transparent arguments explicitly
valorize: married parents and their biological children, conceived “the
old-fashioned way.”189
B. Establishing the Donor-Conceived Network as Family
In addition to establishing the traditional family as the ideal family,
the incest prevention justification also establishes the donor-conceived
network as a family. More specifically, the argument from incest
assumes that gamete donation creates unintended “families,”190 as
incest is defined above all else as a familial crime.191 “[T]he very
existence of a taboo against incest,” Judith Butler writes, “presumes
that a family structure is already there, for how else would one
understand the prohibition on sexual relations with members of one’s
own family without a prior conception of family?”192 Thus, to argue
that sexual relationships between two donor-conceived individuals
(two “siblings”), or between a donor and the person conceived from
his or her gametes (a “parent” and his/her “child”), is “incest,” is to
assume that these individuals are, in fact, family members.
Current law, however, is far from settled on the precise legal
relationship that exists between such persons. For instance, it is
188

On this point, see Franklin, supra note 23, at 828.
MARQUARDT, ONE PARENT OR FIVE, supra note 60, at 23.
190 By “unintended” families, this Article means the persons in the donor network
who do not intend to be in a family, for example, individuals conceived from the same
donor but who have different legal parents.
191 See Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1504 (1998)
(stating that “[i]n 1793, [i]ncest was a crime grounded in principles of morality,
property, and the laws governing inheritance” but “[b]y the end of this century, the
crime had been transformed into a crime against the person: a very personal kind of
sexual assault against the body, usually of a child”); Dubber, supra note 103, at 742
(stating that “[i]ncest . . . if it is to be a crime, is generally categorized not as a crime
against autonomy and sexual autonomy, in particular, but as a crime against the
family”).
192 BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, supra note 146, at 157.
189
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unclear whether donor-conceived individuals would qualify as
“siblings” under state incest laws.193 Incest statutes do not define who
siblings are, other than to state that sexual relationships (or marriage)
between “brothers” and “sisters” “of the whole or of the half-blood”
are prohibited.194 The phrase “of the whole or of the half-blood” fails
to adequately define who “brothers” and “sisters” are, as it simply
refers to individuals who are related by at least one common ancestor.
In addition, that phrase typically applies under incest laws to nonsibling relationships as well, including relationships between
individuals and their nieces or nephews “of the whole or [of the] halfblood.”195 In other words, the phrase “of the whole or of the halfblood” does not define “brother” and “sister”; rather, it simply
qualifies those terms.
Perhaps we are to assume that for the purpose of incest laws siblings
are those people who are descended from a common “ancestor” or
“parent.” Even in that case, though, it is not clear that donorconceived individuals are descended from a common “parent.” The
anonymous donors from commercial sperm banks that exponents of
the accidental incest rationale are especially worried about are not
treated as legal parents in any jurisdiction.196
In addition, in many settings, it is often the case that individuals
who descend from the same biological progenitor are not treated as
related because they do not share the same legal parent. For instance,
in the adoption context, “[w]hen siblings are adopted into separate
families, many states . . . treat the sibling relationship as
terminated.”197 This suggests that in some jurisdictions the legal
relationship between “brothers” and “sisters” is based on legal
parentage, not on a blood tie.198 Federal immigration law follows this
193 See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 118 (observing that “when it comes to
donor conceived offspring, coverage [of state incest laws] is similarly unclear: the ban
may not cover siblings who grow up in different families, nor those who are related by
a half, rather than a full, genetic tie. Consequently, not all states might bar
relationships between donors and their children, nor between donor related
siblings”).
194 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A 13 3 (2015) (prohibiting marriages and sexual
relationships between an individual and “(1) [h]is ancestor or descendant by blood or
adoption; or (2) [h]is brother or sister of the whole or half blood or by adoption; or
(3) [h]is stepchild or stepparent, while the marriage creating the relationship exists;
or (4) [h]is aunt, uncle, nephew or niece of the whole or half blood”).
195 See id.
196 See Polikoff, supra note 39, at 240 41.
197 Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 908 (2012).
198 See James G. Dwyer, Reforming Parentage Laws: A Child Centered Approach to
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approach as well, treating the legal relationship between biological
siblings as severed upon adoption because of the change in parental
status that adoption entails.199
Applying this logic to the donor-conceived context, it would appear
that individuals conceived from the same donor gametes, but raised in
separate legal families, are not siblings because they lack a legal
relationship to a common parent. Indeed, they are even less related
than the individuals in the adoption scenarios discussed above because
donor-conceived individuals never shared a legal parent at all.
Whereas individuals born to the same parents but adopted into
different families are related at birth, donor-conceived individuals lack
even that temporary connection.
At the same time, though, there are also instances where courts have
applied incest laws purely on the basis of biology, even where the legal
relationship between individuals had been severed — or, in some
cases, had never existed at all.200 These cases suggest that donorParentage Law, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 843, 853 (2006). Some courts have found
that adoption also severs the legal relationship between biological parents and their
children. For example, in one case, a court held that a criminal incest law did not
apply to a sexual relationship between a defendant and his biological “daughter”
because she was adopted by another family and therefore no longer a “daughter” to
the defendant. See State v. Fischer, 493 N.E.2d 1265, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that “the adopted child is the same as dead to its [biological] parents” and
therefore the state incest statute did not apply). That case was overruled by the
Indiana Supreme Court three years later. See Bohall v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1214, 1215
16 (Ind. 1989) (holding that “natural parents whose children ha[ve] been adopted
[are not excluded] from the prohibitions of the incest statute”).
199 In Young v. Reno, for instance, the Ninth Circuit held that the Immigration and
Nationalization Service (“INS”) did not abuse its discretion by denying a woman’s visa
petition on behalf of her biological siblings because it was proper to conclude, as the
INS did, that siblings’ relationship to each other derived from their relationship to a
common parent or parents. The petitioner’s adoption into a different household, the
INS reasoned, severed her relationship to those common parents, thereby destroying
the sibling relationship as well. Young v. Reno, 114 F.3d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1997).
200 See, e.g., La Bove v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 264 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1959)
(observing that “if the natural parent and the natural child should marry after the
natural child has been adopted by somebody else, we cannot think that the marriage
would be any less incestuous because of the adoption”); State v. Holden, 429 A.2d
1321, 1323 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (applying incest statute to half brother and half
sister whose legal relationship had been terminated by the sister’s adoption into a new
family); State v. J.R., No. E2007 01775 COA R3 CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306, at
*1 2 (May 21, 2008) (finding that “siblings retain the status of brother and sister for
purposes of the incest statute even if their parents’ parental rights are terminated and
one of the siblings is later adopted”); see also Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the
Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1141 (2003) [hereinafter Perfect Substitutes]
(observing that when Massachusetts amended its adoption statute in 1867 to include
marriages between a child and her adoptive parent, the state “clarified that, although
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conceived individuals who descend from a common biological
progenitor might be considered siblings, even though they lack any
other relationship to each other and even though their biological
progenitor lacks any other relationship to either of them.
Of course, that individuals can be considered family members in one
context (incest statutes) but not in another (immigration law) reveals
just how contingent and provisional the legal category of “family” is in
the first place. Indeed, who qualifies as “family” depends on a
normative understanding of what family “ought to be” in any
particular context rather than on a descriptive reflection of what
family “is” in some absolute and invariant sense. To say that bloodrelated individuals qualify as family members in one setting but not in
another is to recognize that “family and familial roles are not
preordained, natural categories.”201 Rather, they are legally, culturally,
and socially “contingent.”202
Even more, it is no surprise that in the above-mentioned examples
individuals were considered “family” for the purpose of a restrictive
incest law and only for that purpose. As this Article has argued, the
purpose of the incest prohibition is to establish kinship.203 Thus
understood, it is unremarkable that a person would be considered a
legal stranger to someone else for all purposes except for incest.
The contemporary incest prevention argument is the product of a
normative choice to view — and establish — donor-conceived
individuals as “family” members. Cahn, the leading academic
exponent of that argument, is aware of its normative dimension. She
recognizes that “the elements of the crime [of incest] may . . . depend
on the definition of family.”204 She also recognizes that “[p]hrasing a
connection [between donor-conceived individuals] in familial terms,
such as sibling, rather than biological terms, such as shared genetic
material, already suggests the appropriate legal and cultural
frameworks.”205 In other words, she recognizes that by “using the
the adopted child was otherwise severed from her biological parents, this was
inapplicable concerning ‘marriage, incest, or cohabitation’”).
201 Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 593 n.12 (2013)
[hereinafter Staging the Family].
202 Id. at 592.
203 For instance, it is the incest prohibition that normalizes and naturalizes
adoptive familial relationships, which, as Cahn has shown, become more “like”
biological familial relationships once they become subject to an incest law. See Cahn,
Perfect Substitutes, supra note 200, at 1143.
204 Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 4, at 62.
205 Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 8, at 380 (emphasis added). Other
proponents of the incest prevention rationale have been even more insistent about
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language of family” in the donor context, she is inviting the law in,
including the law of incest.206
But that is precisely Cahn’s objective. In her recent book on donorconceived communities, The New Kinship: Constructing DonorConceived Families,207 as well as in the law review article that preceded
it,208 Cahn advocates a re-conceptualization of the donor community
in familial terms as well as the enactment of regulations that
recognize, respect, and facilitate the donor community’s desire for
familial connection.209 Cahn argues that alternative reproduction
creates people who exist in “familial” networks but that the law has
failed to “respect” them as such because of two conceptual flaws: first,
the use of a medical model rather than a family law model to evaluate
alternative reproduction;210 and second, the privileging of the privacy/
using the language of family to conceptualize donor communities, referring to sperm
donors as “fathers” and to egg donors as “mothers.” See infra notes 245 47 and
accompanying text. Recent empirical evidence suggests that sperm donors, but not egg
donors, think of themselves in parental/familial terms. See RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS:
THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 145, 149 (2011). Almeling reports that
“[m]ost sperm donors define themselves as fathers to children born of their
donations,” id. at 145, whereas “[m]ost egg donors, who have exactly the same genetic
relationship to offspring as sperm donors, come to the opposite conclusion: they are
not mothers.” Id. at 149. Almeling’s empirical findings contrast with the image of
sperm and egg donors that often surfaces in commentary about gamete donation,
which tends to conceptualize egg donors as maternal and sperm donors as mere
facilitators of conception. See, e.g., Noa Ben Asher, The Curing Law: On the Evolution of
Baby Making Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1910 (2009) (discussing a court
decision characterizing a sperm donor as someone who provides “merely a gamete”)
(citation omitted); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Marketization and Families: A Woman’s
Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1757 65 (2010) (discussing the sex stereotypes that
accompany proposed regulatory reform of egg donation).
206 CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 8. Even so, Cahn sometimes places smart
quotes around familial terms when they reference individuals involved in the gamete
donor network
“father” for sperm donor, “parents” for gamete donors, “children”
for donor conceived individuals. In so doing, she suggests that those persons are not
“real” or “true” relatives. Id. at 32 33, 86; Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 8, at 415.
207 CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7 (advocating for the enactment of law that
recognizes the donor community’s desire for familial connection).
208 Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 8.
209 Some of those relationships are “sibling” in nature, as when one gamete donor
helps to create several children who feel (and desire) a “sibling” connection with other
children conceived from the same donor. See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 129
(stating that “members of the donor community should be able to find out the identity
of their donors and their biologically related ‘siblings’”). Other relationships are
“parent/child” in nature, as when a gamete donor helps to create a child who, in time,
desires identifying information about her unknown “mother” or “father.”
210 See CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 175; Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note
8, at 373.
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autonomy interests of alternative reproduction’s users above the
familial/relational interests of its eventual creations.211 Cahn calls for
the replacement of this “medical” model of alternative reproduction
with a “family law” model — for “the paradigm shift away from
viewing donor-conceived families and their communities as scientific
and medical constructs and instead viewing them as relational
entities.”212 Cahn’s suggested legal interventions are explicitly
grounded in a familial conception of the donor network. She says in
her book: “This guidance provides the basis for the recommendations
developed in the next two chapters, which focus on additional
regulation of the fertility industry and further facilitation of the integrity
of the family networks.”213 The incest prevention rationale is just one
aspect — albeit a key aspect, as it is the initial legal mechanism that
conceptualizes the donor network in familial terms — of this larger
project of establishing the donor community as a family.
Importantly, the “paradigm shift” in social norms that Cahn
envisions might itself amount to establishment. As Clare Huntington
has argued, “social norms often play a far more important, and
certainly more pervasive, role in shaping familial behavior than direct
legal regulation.”214 Moreover, the state shapes and influences social
norms about the family in “unseen” or invisible ways all the time,215
Huntington writes, from enacting infant safe haven laws and
mandatory ultrasound laws to advocating for marriage equality.216
211

See Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 8, at 373.
CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 137.
213 Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
214 Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1115
(2010) [hereinafter Familial Norms and Normality]; see also Huntington, Staging the
Family, supra note 201, at 608 n.90 (stating that “[s]ocial norms play a central role in
regulating family life”).
215 Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, supra note 214, at 1114. Like
Huntington, other scholars have discussed the law’s power to shape social norms,
particularly in the family law area. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination:
The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1380 (2009);
Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1259 (2009); Camille Gear Rich,
Innocence Interrupted: Reconstructing Fatherhood in the Shadow of Child Molestation
Law, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 609 passim (2013); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling
Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 518 19 (1992). Social norms, like the
law that shapes them, are often invisible. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 912 (1996) (observing that “when social norms appear
not to be present, it is only because they are so taken for granted that they seem
invisible”).
216 See Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, supra note 214, at 1134 46. The
legal regulations surrounding reproduction buttress “a social norm that stigmatizes
212
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Indeed, the state is a social norm “entrepreneur”217 writ large, and
those social norms can have the effect of “establishing” the family no
less than — and perhaps even more than — direct regulation.218
Thus understood, the incest prevention justification establishes the
family as much by the social norms that it creates — inviting, if not
effectively forcing, all individuals in the donor network to think of
themselves in familial terms — as by the direct regulation that it could
precipitate. In this sense, the incest prevention justification coheres
and coincides with another leading rationale for regulating alternative
reproduction: protecting a child’s “right to know” her genetic
progenitors.219 “Right to know” arguments derive from a medically
dubious condition — “genealogical bewilderment” — that might very
well create the very conditions of yearning that it purports to
diagnose.220 Like the incest prevention justification, the “right to
know” argument assumes (and, in the process, solidifies) the existence
of familial and genetic connection — even in cases where no such
connection exists but for the argument itself. Indeed, at the “heart” of
the choice to have an abortion.” Id. at 1136.
217 Sunstein, supra note 215, at 909 (referring to a certain class of people as “norm
entrepreneurs,” that is, “people interested in changing social norms”).
218 For the relationship between state sanctioned social norms and familial
establishment, see Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non Traditional
Kinship and the Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 67 70
(2012) [hereinafter Regulating at the Margins].
219 See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Children’s Interests and Information Disclosure: Who
Provided the Egg and Sperm? Or Mommy, Where (and Whom) Do I Come From?, 2 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 1, 5 (2001) (arguing that “disclosure recognizes the potential
relationship between the child and her forebears”); Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note
8, at 416 (characterizing donor conceived children’s interest in obtaining identifying
information about their biological progenitors as a “right to know”); Lucy Frith,
Gamete Donation, Identity, and the Offspring’s Right to Know, 9 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS
644, 644 45 (2007).
220 See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 404 (1991) (arguing
that the claim that children are harmed when they lack information about their
genetic identity “appears to confuse the psychological notion of self identity with the
relatively more superficial knowledge of one’s biological legacy” and criticizing this
view for being “not only dubious empirically but also an atavistic throwback to the
priority of blood ties over all else as a determinant of one’s sense of self”); Kimberly
Leighton, Addressing the Harms of Not Knowing One’s Heredity: Lessons from
Genealogical Bewilderment, 3 ADOPTION & CULTURE 64, 66 (2012) (stating that “the
diagnosis of ‘genealogical bewilderment’ is itself generative of the very conditions of
such suffering” and that “the reasoning behind genealogical bewilderment produces
the very phenomenon it believes itself to be explaining”); Iain Walker & Pia
Broderick, The Psychology of Assisted Reproduction
or Psychology Assisting Its
Reproduction?, 34 AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOLOGIST 38, 39 40 (1999).
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both arguments “is a foundational commitment to a particular view of
what a family is and, based on this view, a judgment as to what a good
family is.”221
Finally, and importantly, the incest prevention justification
establishes not just donor networks in familial terms, but also the
family in genetic terms. The only reason to conceptualize donor
networks in relational/familial terms — and, therefore, to apply the
laws of incest to them — is because of “the genetic tie” that some of
the persons in those networks share.222 Applying the paradigmatic law
of the family to the donor-conceived setting reinforces the prominence
— the primacy even — of genes in defining who our “true” family
is.223 In fact, what Cahn sees as “the new kinship” is a relationship
defined solely by biology and genes, and therefore not so new at all.
V.

NORMATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE

The foregoing Parts presented the incest prevention rationale,
offered a theory for what is motivating it, and teased out the more
specific ways in which that rationale establishes the family in the
alternative reproduction context. Part V now turns to the reasons why
we ought to reject that rationale as a basis for regulating alternative
reproduction; each of these reasons relates to the familial
establishment discussed in Part IV. Section A argues that the incest
prevention justification ought to be rejected because it reflects and
reproduces familial norms that not only encourage or nudge
individuals in the donor network to conceptualize themselves in
familial terms (when they might very well prefer to exist as legal
strangers), but also are out of sync with the image of kinship that
emerges from contemporary family and marriage equality law. Section
B argues that the incest prevention justification ought to be rejected
because it disrupts the trend in American constitutional law toward
greater familial autonomy and familial self-determinism; it also
conflicts with a key principle advanced by recent marriage equality
jurisprudence — familial disestablishment — and is part and parcel of

221

Leighton, supra note 220, at 65 66.
See Roberts, supra note 37, at 210 11.
223 See Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON
L. REV. 347, 386 (2008) (observing that “[t]he connection among donor siblings or
between a donor and the children produced from his sperm is not even grounded in
family narratives about a family that once was. The existence of a family is suggested
only by suppositions about shared DNA”).
222
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a larger regulatory attempt to graft the same logic that long supported
marriage inequality onto the law of reproduction.
A. Normative Critique
The incest prevention justification reflects and reproduces norms
about the family that channel individuals in the donor network to
think of themselves in familial terms and that conflict with the more
fluid image of kinship that has emerged from contemporary family law
jurisprudence. As such, the incest prevention justification warrants
critique not just because it forces individuals to conform to a
particular familial norm but also because it allows a particular familial
norm to flourish at all.
Part IV argued that the incest prevention justification establishes the
family in a variety of ways, including through the dissemination of
norms about the donor-network that encourage individuals to think of
themselves in familial terms. Scholars have long recognized family
law’s “channeling function,” first identified as such by Professor Carl
Schneider in an influential article dedicated to the panoply of ways in
which family law supports its preferred kinship models — including
biological, dual-gendered parenthood224 — and nudges individuals
into conforming to them. Since Schneider’s seminal piece was
published in 1992, scholars have identified countless examples of
family law’s channeling project, from the parental performances that
the law so often encourages (if not demands) parents to satisfy225 to
the sexual and intimate relationships into which the state attempts to
direct its citizens.226 Even when the law recognizes and protects nontraditional intimacy and family formation — as when the Supreme
Court decided Lawrence v. Texas, which established a constitutionallygrounded liberty right to “certain” sexual conduct between two
members of the same sex227 — it is engaged in channeling work.228 In
224 Schneider, supra note 215, at 501 02 (arguing that the law “might posit an
institution of ‘parenthood’ with several key normative characteristics. Parents should
be married to each other. They are preferably the biological father and mother of their
child”).
225 See, e.g., Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, supra note 214, at 1112 14
(providing several examples of instances when the state attempts to influence families
by enacting legal rules that have indirect effects); Huntington, Staging the Family,
supra note 201, at 618 21 (citing cases regarding demands of parental performances).
226 See Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59
EMORY L.J. 809, 813 18 (2010).
227 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
228 Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 226, at 829 (arguing that “the Lawrence
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fact, some might say that the law’s channeling impulse is at its height
during such moments.229
The incest prevention justification for regulating third-party gamete
donation represents the most recent chapter in family law’s
“channeling story.”230 Just as the law of divorce shapes spouses’
conduct and identities during an intact marriage,231 and just as
Lawrence v. Texas shapes and “channels all sex” into “one marriagelike form,”232 so too does the incest prevention justification channel
individuals in the donor network into a particular familial model —
the biological family — by encouraging them to situate themselves
within that model. In this sense, the same channeling impulse that has
motivated the regulation of intimate and family relations in myriad
other settings — the criminal law, the law of divorce — is making its
presence felt in the law of alternative reproduction, an area which is
already inflected by “cultural understandings of biological sex
differences as well as gendered expectations of women and men.”233
Indeed, to regulate alternative reproduction on the basis of a taboo
whose very purpose is to create “heterosexual desire and discrete
gender identity,”234 and which has been used throughout the history of
American law to achieve that purpose, would perpetuate the
channeling impulse that motivates so much of the law surrounding
intimate and familial relations — including, increasingly, the law of
alternative reproduction.
To be sure, it may very well be true that individuals involved in
alternative reproduction already think of themselves in familial terms.
model for protecting sexual conduct is problematic not only because it channels gay
sex into one marriage like form, but also because it channels all sex into such a
form”); see also id. at 835 (arguing more generally that “[b]y promoting one vision of
intimacy
that of a couple engaged in emotional and sexual intimacy
the law
ignores those individuals whose lives do not conform to [a] narrow definition of
intimacy and reinforces incentives for others to structure their lives in ways that
embrace that definition” (emphasis added)).
229 See Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, supra note 3, at 1605 06.
230 See Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 226, at 839.
231 See Schneider, supra note 215, at 502.
232 Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 226, at 829.
233 ALMELING, supra note 205, at 2. Almeling uncovers the gendered scripts which
influence both the law of, and the culture surrounding, alternative reproduction. Her
research reveals the highly gendered framework in which gamete banks and their
employees operate. She states: “[W]omen donating eggs [are] perceived as altruistic
helpers who want nothing more than for recipients to have families, while men
donating sperm [are] construed as employees performing a job with little care for the
bank’s customers.” Id. at 10.
234 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 130, at 97.
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For instance, one outspoken user of anonymous gametes and her son,
Wendy and Ryan Kramer, together maintain a database, called The
Donor Sibling Registry, which allows individuals to search for
“siblings” conceived from the same gamete donor.235 The Kramers
explicitly conceptualize the relationships that exist between
individuals conceived from the same gametes (but raised in different
families) in familial terms (as “siblings”236), as do other donorconceived children,237 scholars,238 and many gamete donors
themselves.239 Viewed from the perspective of these individuals, the
incest prevention justification accurately — and rightly — captures
the familial ties that exist between donors and their offspring as well
as between donor-conceived children.
At the same time, though, it is also likely true that not all donorconceived children approach other members of the donor network in
this way. For instance, the Institute’s survey of donor-conceived
children, My Daddy’s Name is Donor, asked children conceived from
donor gametes “Which word(s) or term(s) best describe what the
phrase ‘sperm donor’ means to you? (check all that apply).”240 Fiftyfive respondents answered “donor,” 32 answered “seed giver,” and 32
answered “contributor of genetic material.” By contrast, only 14
answered “father,” 26 “biological father,” 8 “other father,” 7 “Dad/
Daddy,” and 26 “genetic father.”241
In addition, the coercive character of social norms renders it
difficult to isolate these individuals’ preferences apart from those
norms. Even if all donor-conceived children did conceptualize their
gamete donors as well as other offspring from the same donor in
familial terms, that could very well be the result of social norms — the

235 Our
History and Mission, DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY, https://www.
donorsiblingregistry.com/about dsr/history and mission (last visited Sept. 4, 2015).
236 As argued earlier, it is by no means clear that the law (at least) treats these
individuals as “siblings,” which denotes a legal (as well as a social) relationship that
exists between individuals who descend from a common ancestor. See supra notes
190 200 and accompanying text.
237 See, e.g., Alana S. Newman, Children’s Rights or Rights to Children?,
WITHERSPOON INST. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/11/
13993/ (discussing her experience as a child of donor gametes).
238 See, e.g., CAHN, NEW KINSHIP, supra note 7, at 137 (using the language of family
to address individuals conceived from the same gametes but raised in different
households).
239 See, e.g., ALMELING, supra note 205, at 145 (summarizing the findings of her
research that sperm donors tend to think of themselves in paternal terms).
240 MARQUARDT, GLENN & CLARK, supra note 54, at 91.
241 Id.
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social norms that both flow from legal regulation (and the reasons for
it, like incest prevention) and are reproduced by that regulation.
A useful analogue here is adoption and the role that social norms
play in adoptees’ quest for their biological progenitors. “Adoptees
almost always search for their birth mother first and their birth father,
if at all, only after they have found their birth mother,” Katharine
Baker writes.242 “If identity is about being rooted in one’s genealogical
past,” she asks, “why do adoptees seem to care more about their
mothers?”243 Baker concludes by suggesting that “cultural scripts”
about maternity and paternity could be playing “a huge role” in
adoptees’ gendered preferences vis-à-vis the search for their biological
progenitors.244
Social norms and “cultural scripts” about the family — and,
specifically, about the paradigmatic nuclear, biologically-bound family
— are no less powerful in the law of alternative reproduction than
they are in the law of adoption.245 The more that law, policy, and
culture conceptualize the donor network in familial terms — by,
among other things, labeling the relationships that could exist within
that network in terms of “incest” — the more likely it is that children
conceived in these networks will conceptualize their donors in familial
terms. The idea that a sperm donor is indistinguishable from a father
pervades American culture; from publications like My Daddy’s Name Is
Donor, which obliterates the boundary between donor and father, to
films like The Switch, where biological paternity’s gravitational pull
leads the film’s “sperm-donor-turned-father” and son (and mother)
into a traditional domestic tableau,246 we are constantly being told that
sperm donors are “fathers” — even by relatively liberal media outlets
like The New York Times, which recently referred to anonymous sperm
donation in paternal terms.247
But the normative critique considered here extends beyond the
channeling effect that the incest prevention justification could have on
individuals involved in alternative reproduction, be they donors,

242 Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L.
REV. 649, 690 (2008).
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.; see ALMELING, supra note 205 passim.
246 Stephen Holden, In a Baste and Switch, a New Father Is Born, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/movies/20switch.html.
247 Mroz, supra note 48 (stating that “there is growing concern among parents,
donors and medical experts about potential negative consequences of having so many
children fathered by the same donors” (emphasis added)).
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recipients, or donor-conceived offspring. Rather, or in addition, this
critique maintains that the incest prevention justification ought to be
rejected because it allows certain familial norms to flourish at all.
Regardless of the incest prevention justification’s potentially coercive
effect on donor-conceived children (and on other individuals involved
in third-party gamete donation), that justification rests on familial
norms that are out of sync with — and quite possibly undermine —
the image of kinship that emerges from contemporary family law and
marriage equality jurisprudence.
More specifically, family law’s once-dominant model of parenthood
based on “formal markers such as biology, gender, sexual orientation,
and even marriage” has gradually been displaced by a model of social
parenthood based on function, conduct, and intent.248 As Doug
NeJaime has recently argued, courts in the 1990s and 2000s started to
recognize the importance of intent and conduct in establishing
parentage; as they did so, “the biological connection” between parent
and child “receded in importance.”249
In one case,250 the California Supreme Court held that a man who
had undertaken the responsibilities of parenthood but who was
neither married to the legal mother of the child whom he cared for,
nor the biological progenitor of that child, could qualify as a legal
parent under the Uniform Parentage Act provision that conferred
parental rights on men who “receive[d] a child into [their] home[s]
and openly h[eld] the child out as [their] natural child.”251 The court’s
analysis in that case suggests that “the meaning of ‘natural’ [was]
contingent, capable of describing a functional, rather than biological,
parent, especially in service of the privatization of support.”252
Similarly, in a trilogy of cases decided by the California Supreme
Court in 2005,253 unmarried lesbian mothers, two of whom bore no
biological relationship to their children, were deemed legal parents of
those children because they intended to raise them as their own and
248 Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, HARV. L. REV.
[hereinafter Marriage Equality] (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 30) (on file with
author).
249 Id. at 20.
250 In re Nicholas H., 28 Cal. 4th 56, 70 (2002) (accepting a non biological father’s
legal parentage under section 7611(d) of California’s Parentage Act on the ground that
he held himself out as the child’s father and functioned in the capacity of the child’s
father).
251 Id. at 58, 63.
252 NeJaime, Marriage Equality, supra note 248, at 24.
253 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108, 113 (2005); K.M. v. E.G., 37 Cal.
4th 130, 144 (2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 37 Cal. 4th 156, 166 (2005).
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did, in fact, raise them as their own.254 These and other cases suggest
that courts have been “embrac[ing] intentional and functional
parenthood” for decades, both within the LGBT family law arena and
beyond it.255
Social parenthood has flourished as a familial norm no less in
contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence than it has in recent
family law jurisprudence; in fact, “marriage equality routes” the
intentional and functional concepts of parentage that underwrite
LGBT family law jurisprudence “into an LGBT-inclusive model of
marriage, pushing intentional and functional parenthood from the
margins to the mainstream.”256 Federal courts around the country
have grounded their marriage equality rulings in the social
relationships that exist between same-sex couples and their children,
not in the biological or genetic ties that might bind them. As NeJaime
writes, the entire marriage equality project “pushes against biological
procreation and gender differentiation and instead centers intentional
and functional parenthood.”257
For instance, in Baskin v. Bogan, which upheld two federal district
court rulings in favor of marriage equality,258 Judge Posner dismissed
Wisconsin and Indiana’s stated rationale for their states’ marriage
prohibitions, namely, “to encourage child-rearing environments where
[biological] parents care for their biological children in tandem.”259
“Why the qualifier ‘biological’?” Judge Posner queried.260 “[F]amily is
about raising children and not just about producing them,” he
continued.261 As NeJaime writes, the Baskin court “centered functional
parenting over procreative sex, gender, and biology.”262 Other courts
have made similar observations, noting that “the parentage statutes [in
California] place a premium on the ‘social relationship,’ not the
‘biological relationship,’ between a parent and a child”263 and that

254 For a discussion of these cases and the California Supreme Court’s reasoning,
see NeJaime, Marriage Equality, supra note 248, at 25 31.
255 Id. at 30.
256 Id. at 38.
257 Id. at 32.
258 Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014).
259 Id. at 663.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 NeJaime, Marriage Equality, supra note 248, at 37.
263 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1087 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013).
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“‘biological relationships are not [the] exclusive determina[nt] of the
existence of a family.’”264
The incest prevention justification is in tension with the norm of
social kinship that has emerged from recent family law and marriage
equality jurisprudence in at least two ways. First and more generally,
that justification is rooted in a taboo whose routine deployment in
American law usually signals a desire to shore up a biologicallygrounded kinship norm: married heterosexual parents and their
biologically-related children, sexually conceived.265 Second and more
concretely, that justification could help to re-establish biological
kinship as a dominant familial norm by making it more difficult for
social kinship to exist, let alone to flourish. Not only does the incest
prevention justification center kinship around biology and encourage
non-traditional procreators (and their offspring) to think about the
families they create (and are born into) in biological terms, but it
could, if successfully implemented — that is, if used to enact
burdensome restrictions on alternative reproduction, as it has in nondomestic jurisdictions — render non-biological kinship a less available
option for individuals who rely on alternative reproduction as a
vehicle of kinship formation.
B. Constitutional Critique
The incest prevention justification disrupts the trend in American
constitutional law toward greater familial autonomy and familial selfdeterminism — a movement reflected in and furthered by
contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence. On this view, the
incest prevention justification is not just normatively undesirable but
also constitutionally deficient.
No less than it reflects the “extension of constitutional rights and
protections to people once ignored or excluded,”266 the arc of
constitutional history reflects a movement toward greater autonomy in
matters of intimate and family life. In the 1960s and 1970s, the
Supreme Court recognized the right of both married couples and
single persons to enter into and maintain non-procreative sexual
relationships267, including the marital relationship, as well as a limited
264 Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977)).
265 See supra notes 174 82 and accompanying text.
266 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).
267 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from treating single
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right of familial self-determination. As the Court declared in Moore v.
East Cleveland: “the Constitution prevents [government] from
standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns.”268
Even before those transformative years, the Court recognized that
constitutional liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, [and to] establish a home and bring up children”269 as well
as that “[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
State to standardize its children.”270 Moreover, since those
transformative years, the Court has articulated an even more robust
liberty right in intimate and family matters, reasoning in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that “the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,”271 and in Lawrence v. Texas
that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”272
Familial rights “have been accorded shelter” not only “under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”273 but also under the
First Amendment’s implied right of intimate association,274 the First
persons and married persons differently with respect to their respective decisions to
use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 86 (1965) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a right to marital
privacy that prohibits the government from criminalizing married persons’ use of
contraception).
268 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion).
269 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
270 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925).
271 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
272 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
273 Moore, 431 U.S. at 501.
274 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
654 (1980). Karst argues that as of the date of his article, “the Supreme Court ha[d]
decided about fifty cases” striking down laws that unduly burden intimate and familial
life; these cases, he suggests, converge “on a single theme: the freedom of intimate
association.” Id. at 625. “[T]he constitutional doctrines that have nurtured the
freedom of intimate association,” he continues, include “the First Amendment, equal
protection, and substantive due process.” Id. The case that best illustrates the First
Amendment dimensions of intimate association is Griswold v. Connecticut, which
described the right at issue there
marital privacy
in associational terms.
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and Fourteenth Amendments’ implied prohibition on familial
establishment,275 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-stereotyping
principle.276 An emerging scholarly view maintains that the
Constitution prohibits government from “encourag[ing] or
discourag[ing] certain kinds of familial relationships”277 no less than it
prohibits government from establishing religion. As Melissa Murray
and Alice Ristroph argue, “the rationales for the Free Exercise and
(non-) Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment support parallel
principles of free exercise and nonestablishment for the family.”278 In a
similar vein, Cary Franklin argues that contemporary Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence — and, specifically, contemporary gay
rights jurisprudence — has developed an “anti-stereotyping principle”
that not only “protects against state action that reinforces stereotypes
that have long incited and justified discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation,” but also “prohibits demands by the government
that gays and lesbians conform to particular heteronormative sex and
family roles.”279
Recent marriage equality jurisprudence both exemplifies and
advances these constitutionally grounded anti-establishment and antistereotyping principles. “[T]here is little doubt that the trend in recent
years [in the law of marriage] is toward a thinner form of
establishment, if not disestablishment,”280 Murray and Ristroph note.
In just the two years since United States v. Windsor281 struck down
section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act on equal protection
grounds,282 numerous courts, including the Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing marriage as an
“association”). Karst, of course, opens his canonical article by citing to Griswold and
its rhetoric of intimate association. Karst, supra, at 624.
275 See David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1008 09
(2002) (applying First Amendment principles of disestablishment and free exercise to
sex and gender); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119
YALE L.J. 1236, 1241 (2010) (viewing the legal regulation of intimate and family life
through an establishment lens).
276 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 23 passim.
277 Ristroph & Murray, supra note 275, at 1240 41.
278 Id. at 1240.
279 Franklin, supra note 23, at 889.
280 Ristroph & Murray, supra note 275, at 1270; see also Tamara Metz, The Liberal
Case for Disestablishing Marriage, 6 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 196, 199 (2007) (arguing
that “by some accounts the establishment of marriage is weakening”).
281 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
282 Id. at 2695. But see Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 219, 220 (2013) (arguing that Windsor is “conceptually, if not doctrinally, a
right to marry case”).
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Obergefell v. Hodges, have found that state marriage prohibitions
violate constitutional equality guarantees, constitutional liberty
guarantees, or both.283 In many of these cases, the state attempted to
justify a same-sex marriage prohibition by arguing that it furthered the
state’s interest in ensuring that children were raised by their biological
parents in a dual-gender household284 — in other words, in the type of
household that the state would like to establish as the normative and
legally preferred one. The state’s lack of success with that justification
in nearly all of the cases in which it was raised supports the arguments
advanced by Murray, Ristroph, and Franklin: the law has moved
toward disestablishment in domestic relations285 and today “prohibits

283 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (finding that “[t]he
right of same sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the
equal protection of the laws”); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014)
(upholding lower court decision finding Virginia’s same sex marriage prohibition
unconstitutional on Equal Protection and Due Process grounds); Bishop v. Smith, 760
F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (upholding district court decision striking down
Oklahoma same sex marriage prohibition on constitutional grounds); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) (upholding district court decision
striking down Utah’s same sex marriage prohibition on Due Process grounds); Love v.
Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (striking down Kentucky’s same
sex marriage prohibition on Equal Protection grounds); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d
1054, 1060 (D. Idaho 2014) (striking down Idaho’s same sex marriage prohibition on
Equal Protection and Due Process grounds).
284 See, e.g., Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1219 21 (finding that Utah’s interest in fostering
biological reproduction and dual gender parenting within marriage did not justify
prohibition against same sex marriage).
285 Importantly, Ristroph and Murray qualify their observation that family law has
moved toward disestablishment in marriage with the following statement: “Although
the marital nuclear family is no longer the only acceptable model for family life,
nonconforming families and family practices are often judged against the model of the
marital nuclear family, further entrenching its primacy as the normative ideal for
intimate life. As such, we would not characterize this trend [in marriage] as complete
disestablishment.” Ristroph & Murray, supra note 275, at 1270 n.160. For an
historical view of marriage as the measure of all relationships, see generally Ariela R.
Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the
Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1649 50, 1654 60 (2003). Some scholars
have recently provided an alternative interpretation of this conventional narrative
regarding the marriage/non marriage dynamic, arguing that marriage is forged in the
shadow of non marriage no less than non marriage is forged in the shadow of
marriage. See, e.g., Cahill, Regulating at the Margins, supra note 218, at 47 48; Douglas
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and its
Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 162 63 (2014) (exposing the
“dialogical” relationship that existed between marriage and non marriage in
California’s LGBT advocacy, litigation, and jurisprudence during the 1980s and
1990s).
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demands by the government that gays and lesbians conform to
particular heteronormative sex and family roles.”286 As in the past, so
too today are courts “set[ting] limits on the state’s power to enforce a
single, normative model of marriage and family.”287
In fact, marriage equality jurisprudence disestablishes not just the
heterosexual family but also the biologically-bound family. Franklin is
right to observe that the anti-stereotyping principle that emerges in
robust form from contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence
animated prior Supreme Court landmarks, including Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,288 which rejected the government’s attempt to
“standardiz[e] its children and its adults by forcing all to live in
certain narrowly defined family patterns.”289 But it is important to
remember that Moore extended constitutional protection only to the
non-nuclear biological family, going out of its way to distinguish that
case from Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,290 where the Court refused to
extend constitutional protection to a purely functional family that
lacked biological connection.291 In addition, the same year that the
Court decided Moore it decided Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform,292 which privileged the biological
family even as it recognized that in some instances non-biological
parents — in that case, foster parents — “hold the same place in the
emotional life of the . . . child, and fulfill the same socializing
functions, as a natural family.”293
In “plac[ing] a new limit on the kinds of sex and family roles the
government may legitimately enforce,”294 and in expanding the
definition of family and parenthood beyond their traditional centering
in biology,295 marriage equality jurisprudence de-privileges biology as
parenthood’s normative ideal — pushing beyond even landmarks like
Moore. The direct result of decades of family law advocacy on behalf of
functional, non-biological parents, the marriage equality precedent
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Franklin, supra note 23, at 889.
Id. at 885.
288 See 431 U.S. 494, 505 06 (1977).
289 Id. at 506.
290 Id. at 498 (distinguishing the statute at issue in Belle Terre from that at issue in
Moore on the ground that, in contrast to the former, the latter “slice[s] deeply into the
family itself”).
291 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 8 (1974).
292 431 U.S. 816, 856 (1977).
293 Id. at 844.
294 Franklin, supra note 23, at 828.
295 See NeJaime, Marriage Equality, supra note 248 passim.
287
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paves the way for disestablishing not just traditional marriage but also
the traditional family, understood to be the family comprised of two
opposite-sex parents and their biologically-related children, sexually
conceived. Indeed, that precedent not only extends relational equality
to same-sex couples, but also reproductive — and family formation —
equality to them.296
Thus understood, the marriage equality precedent renders the incest
taboo, dependent as it is on a model of gender, sexuality, and the
family that courts are rapidly discarding as the only normatively valid
one, a precarious foundation on which to base the law of alternative
reproduction. In Kitchen v. Herbert, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit embraced a robust principle of familial disestablishment,
criticizing not just exclusionary marriage laws but also laws that
burden an individual’s constitutionally guaranteed right to “establish a
family.”297 In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court recognized as a
factual matter that “same-sex couples” have been “establish[ing]
families” for decades,298 and that “gays and lesbians can create loving,
supporting families,” both “biological [and] adopted.”299 Equally
important, Obergefell recognized as a constitutional matter that
“choices concerning . . . family relationships”300 receive robust
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The principles of familial disestablishment and familial autonomy
that emerge from Obergefell, Kitchen, and other marriage equality
precedents are in serious tension with contemporary arguments for
regulating reproduction that hearken back to a taboo — the taboo —
that in both theory and application is used to establish normative
kinship. To anchor regulation of alternative reproduction in a taboo
long used to sustain traditional, biological parenthood and
heteronormative sex roles would prioritize a paradigm of intimate and
familial relations that the marriage equality precedent — to say
nothing of the entire marriage equality project — rejects.

296 See id. at 38 (arguing that courts ruling in favor of marriage equality for same
sex couples have “resist[ed] distinctions between biological procreation and assisted
reproduction
and thus between paradigmatic different sex and same sex families”).
297 Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014).
298 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 97 (2015).
299 Id. at 2600.
300 Id. at 2599.
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CONCLUSION
This Article’s immediate subject has been the use of incest anxiety to
regulate alternative reproduction in ways that impose significant
burdens on individuals’ freedom to choose whether, how, and under
what conditions to procreate and “establish a family.”301 Its larger
concern, though, is with the way in which the arguments that have
been used for decades to sustain marriage inequality are being retooled
in the alternative procreative setting to sustain reproductive
inequality. The incest prevention justification is just one part — albeit
a key part — of a larger regulatory effort by some more conservative
commentators to use the law surrounding alternative reproduction to
establish both the traditional family and traditional family formation.
Its emergence in contemporary discussions over alternative
reproduction — and why it ought to be more heavily regulated than it
is currently — reminds us that the logic that animated marriage
inequality for decades persists, even as courts around the country are
in nearly uniform agreement over its normative and constitutional
deficiencies. At the very least, the marriage equality precedent stands
for the proposition that the logic used to establish the family in the
past (including, but not limited to, the incest prevention justification)
ought not, and likely cannot, stimulate radical legal reform of
alternative reproduction — and particularly legal reform that enforces
the state’s normative paradigm of kinship, dampens individuals’
procreative choice, and forces the thousands of individuals who rely
on alternative reproduction as a vehicle of family formation to
conform to the state’s preferred vision of intimate and family life.

301

Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1199.

